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The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law 
CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA * 
This Article questions the conventional wisdom that the patent system should continue 
to encourage "early filing" of patent applications-filing at the beginning stages of 
technological development. The current thinking regarding early filing fails to account 
for the lack of technical and market information available about the invention at the 
early stages of development. A "file early, file often" mentality is instilled in inventors, 
exacerbating such systemic patent problems as too many patent applications, too many 
patents, underdevelopment of patented technology, increased assertion of patent rights, 
and fuzzy patent boundaries, to name a few. The Article suggests that in response 
patent law should require that an invention be actually reduced to practice before 
examination-not a full-blown commercialization, but a real-world embodiment that 
demonstrates that the invention works for its intended purpose and the inventor has 
proceeded further down the development time line. 
• Professor of Law, Intellectual Property Institute, University of Richmond Law School. I 
would like to thank the Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law at the University of 
Houston Law Center for awarding this Article the 2008 Competitive Scholarship Grant for tenured 
and tenure-track professors. I would also like to thank Michael Abramowicz, Jonathan Barnett, 
Dawn-Marie Bey, Colleen Chien, Jim Gibson, Robin Feldman, Scott Hemphill, Tim Holbrook, Paul 
Janicke, Lee Ann Lockridge, Clarisa Long, Mark Lemley, Bhaven Sampat, Greg Vetter, and the 
participants of the 2008 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at Stanford Law School and 
workshops at Columbia Law School, SMU Law School, and the University of Houston Law School for 
their helpful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual Ventures is a private company that sees invention as a 
full-time activity.' Instead of engaging in traditional product 
development, Intellectual Ventures produces "pure invention."2 To this 
end, the company has filed more than five hundred patent applications, 
inventing via one- to two-day "brainstorming sessions."3 The company 
has also acquired thousands of additional patents as part of its overall 
strategy of looking for inventions addressing "problems that will need a 
solution 5-10 years from now."4 
IBM engages in a somewhat similar activity. For sixteen straight 
years, IBM has received more United States patents than any other 
company in the world.5 It received 4186 patents in 2008.6 This is the result 
1. Press Release, Intellectual Ventures, Intellectual Ventures Files sooth Patent Application 2 
(June 26, 2oo6), www.intellectualventures.corPJdocs/sooapps.pdf. 
2. /d. 
3· /d. at 1; Intellectual Ventures-Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.intellectualventures.com/ 
Faq.aspx (follow "How do you come up with your invention ideas?" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 4, 
2009) ("IV's (Intellectual Venture's] invention efforts center on 'invention sessions' which are 
multidisciplinary brainstorming events focused on a particular set of issues and possible solutions. IV 
typically hosts several 1-2 day invention sessions per month."). 
4· Intellectual Ventures-Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3; Malcolm Gladwell, In the Air: 
Who Says Big Ideas Are Rare?, NEw YoRKER, May 12, 2008, at 50; Michael Orey & Moira Herbal, 
Inside Nathan Myhrvold's Mysterious New Idea Machine, Bus. WK., July 3, 2006. at 54 (describing the 
brainstorming technique used to produce inventions). 
5· See Patents, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS DAILY, Jan 16., 2009, (IBM becoming the first company 
to pass the four-thousand-in-one-year mark). 
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of a deliberate business model intended to produce patents for the 
purpose of actively licensing them.7 IBM's efforts have been successful 
not only in producing a large number of patents, but also in generating 
approximately $1 billion a year for the company.8 
Intellectual Ventures and IBM are examples of a larger trend in 
patent law. The number of patents being applied for is growing 
exponentially, at a rate far greater than the growth of the U.S. economy.9 
And patent holding companies-companies whose sole goal is to file and 
acquire patents-"have become commonplace in the modem patent 
system." 10 This situation has policymakers and scholars searching for a 
reason why patenting far outpaces actual innovation." 
This Article provides an explanation for such patenting-patent 
rules that push inventors to file for patents early in the technological 
development process. The United States patent system actively 
encourages so-called "early filing." 12 Early filing causes patents to be 
applied for well before a commercial use is identifiable.13 And while 
commentators have criticized the activities of Intellectual Ventures and 
IBM and the large number of undeveloped patents as socially harmful, 14 
no one really questions the early-filing doctrine that facilitates them. 
6. !d. 
7· See IBM Intellectual Property and Licensing, http://www.ibm.com/ibmllicensing/ (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2009) ("In addition to delivering these innovations through its products and services, IBM 
maintains an active patent and technology licensing program."). 
8. See KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN 
VALUE oF PATENTS 58 (2000) (stating IBM's licensing revenue as $I billion annually); Gideon 
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, I54 U. PA. L. REv. I, 8 (2005) ("[S)ince the mid-
I990S, IBM has avowedly followed a portfolio-focused patenting strategy, which yielded a more than 
400% increase in patent-related revenues (to about $1.5 billion, or about a quarter of total corporate 
receipts) even as the research and development budget was slashed .... ");IBM Intellectual Property 
and Licensing, supra note 7· 
9· See, e.g., Frederic M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United 
States 28-29 (Harvard Univ. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working Paper No. RWP07-042, 2007), available 
at http://ssm.com/abstract=963 I36. 
10. Blair Silver, Controlling Patent Trolling With Civil RICO, I I YALE J.L. & TECH. 70, 72 (2009). 
I 1. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEo. L.J. 435,435-36 (2004) (labeling the 
question, "The Case of the Disappearing Patents"). 
12. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 
269--70 (I977) (describing the early filing nature of the U.S. patent system). 
I3. See infra Part liLA. 
I4. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CoRNELL 
L. REv. 1065, 1066-67 (2007); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 6o STAN. L. 
REv. 863, 867--69 (2007) (describing the "line of analysis" that patenting activities such as IBM's lead 
to detrimental patent thickets); Nicholas Varchaver, Who's Afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?, FoRTUNE, 
July IO, 2oo6, at IIO (describing industry concern over Intellectual Venture's potential assertion of its 
large patent portfolio). 
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In fact, many scholars have concluded that encouraging early filing 
is beneficial. 15 Edmund Kitch, in describing his seminal "Prospect 
Theory" of patent law, identified the benefit to early filing as the end of 
wasteful rivalrous races to develop a given technology. 16 The early filer 
can then use her exclusivity to efficiently manage and coordinate the 
invention's technological and commercial development. 17 John Duffy 
recently expanded on this line of thinking, noting that the earlier a patent 
is filed, the earlier the patent expires, and the earlier the claimed 
invention becomes part of the public domain. 18 
This discussion fails to recognize some fundamental facts, which are 
explored in this Article. First, early filing forces inventors to make filing 
decisions and draft applications with little technical or market 
information about the invention. 19 Patent law encourages filing shortly 
after the invention is mentally conceived. At this stage of development, 
the inventor has gained no knowledge from the invention's actual 
implementation and use.20 Nor has the inventor been able to fully explore 
the invention's commercial viability.21 Inventors must file-with little 
information and great uncertainty as to the invention's worth-or risk 
losing their patent rights forever. 22 Under these circumstances, most 
inventors file first and ask questions later. 
Second, as time passes after the initial filing, more information 
about the invention is uncovered. This new information prompts the 
filing of more patent applications to cover variations of the invention 
that are now better-defined or shown to be of some commercial worth.23 
The current early-filing nature of the patent system, in the end, creates a 
"file early, file often" attitude, explaining the ever-rising number of 
undeveloped patents. 24 
The United States patent system is intentionally structured to 
encourage patent filing early in an invention's development. The patent 
system prompts early filing in two ways. First, it removes most barriers to 
early filing by not forcing the inventor to actually make the invention 
prior to filing or show that the invention successfully produces the 
15. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Cm. L. REv. 439, 440 
(2004); Kitch, supra note 12. 
16. Kitch, supra note 12, at 265...Q6, 278-79. 
17· /d. at 276-79. 
18. Duffy, supra note 15, at 444,475-80. 
19. See infra Part III.A.2. 
20. See infra Part III.A.r.a. 
21. See infra Part III.A.r.b. 
22. See infra Part III.B. 
23. See infra Part III.B.2. 
24. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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intended results. 25 Second, the system penalizes those who file later in the 
development process. The later one files, the later one's presumed date 
of invention and the greater the chance that some intervening 
development (some new "prior art") will render the invention no longer 
new or non-obvious in light of what has been done before, and thus 
unpatentable. 26 
Pending legislation proposes to change the United States to a first-
to-file patent system. Patents would be awarded not to the first to invent 
the invention, but the first to file a patent application claiming the 
invention.27 Under the proposed first-to-file system, an even greater 
premium will be placed upon an early filing date, with the patent right 
going to the first filer even if she was not the first to invent.28 This makes 
a critique of early filing especially timely. 
Filing early and often exacerbates many of the patent system's most 
recognized problems. It adds significantly to the ever-rising number of 
applications, contributing to the backlog and burden on the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that reduces the quality of 
examination and issued patents.29 More applications means more issued 
patents, which cause problems of their own, particularly if they are "bad" 
patents.3" The earlier patents are filed, the more likely they go 
undeveloped.3' Commercialization does not occur because of the great 
uncertainty and the minimal investment at the time of filing.32 Asserting 
an early-filed patent is a cheaper alternative to commercialization. This 
low-cost option entices patent trolls who use patents solely to extract 
rents from those engaged in commercial development.33 The dearth of 
information and the great uncertainty at the time of filing also 
contributes to the lack of clarity in the patent's specification and claims, 
causing patent boundaries to be unclear.34 A lack of adequate notice is 
seen by some as the root cause of the patent system's problems.35 
25. See infra Part LA. (explaining the constructive reduction to practice doctrine and the utility 
requirement for patentability). 
26. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006) (setting forth the patentability requirements of novelty and 
non-obviousness); infra Part LB. 
27. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, ruth Cong. § 2 (2009). 
28. See id.; infra Part LC. 
29. See infra Part III.C.r. (explaining how more patent applications overburden the USPTO, 
which impedes the USPTO's ability to thoroughly review each application, resulting in erroneous 
determinations of patentability). 
30. See infra Part III.C. r. 
31. See infra Part III.C.2. 
32. See infra Part III.C.2. 
33· See infra Part III.C.3. 
34· See infra Part IILC.4. 
35· See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8--14 (2006). 
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This Article offers a novel solution-moving examination to a later 
point in the development cycle. The solution attempts to optimize 
examination time to gain the benefits articulated by Kitch, Duffy, and 
others while allowing more information and greater certainty about the 
invention to be obtained prior to filing.36 Doing so requires abolition of 
the current practice of allowing the patent application to substitute for 
actually building and implementing the invention. Instead, all inventors 
would be required to reduce their invention to practice before 
examination begins and, in turn, prior to the issuance of the patent. 
Having such a requirement would push examination further down the 
development timeline. More invention information would be available 
during examination, and this additional barrier to patenting would 
reduce the number of applications in need of examining and ultimately 
issued as patents. This new standard would bring with it significant 
flexibility, tailoring its requirements to industry practice.37 Potential 
inventors would not be priced out of the incentives of the patent system, 
nor would the timing of patenting be pushed too far down the 
development process, as complete commercialization prior to filing 
would not be required. 
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, the patent rules that 
encourage early filing are explored. Part II examines the previously-
articulated benefits to early filing discussed by Kitch, Duffy, and others, 
and also recites the critiques of these benefits. Part III articulates the 
costs associated with an early filing system that have yet to be fully 
explored by other scholars. Part III begins by placing the early filing 
decision in the context of the typical new-technology development 
process and eventually concludes by exploring the many problems such a 
mentality creates-too many applications, too many patents, 
underdevelopment of patented technology, and increased assertion of 
patent rights, to name a few. Part IV proposes moving to an actual 
reduction to practice requirement to optimize examination time. 
Recognizing the costs associated with early filing and the benefits of 
requiring an actual reduction to practice has far-reaching implications for 
the current patent discourse. Early filing exacerbates almost all of the 
major concerns with the patent system, including the rising number of 
applications, the underdevelopment of patented inventions, the creation 
of patent thickets, the problem of patent trolls, and the lack of notice of 
patent boundaries. Attempting to rectify the folly of early filing can go a 
long way in solving these systemic patent problems. 
36. See infra Part IV. 
37· See infra Part IV.C. 
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I. PATENT LAW RULES THAT ENCOURAGE EARLY FILING 
United States patent law, and in fact most national patent system 
law, has long encouraged inventors to file their patent applications 
shortly after the invention's conception. This encouragement is achieved 
in two ways. First, patent law removes many of the potential barriers to 
early filing by having no actual reduction to practice requirement, a lax 
·utility requirement, and the ability to file a provisional application. 
Second, patent law incentivizes inventors to take advantage of the ability 
to file early by creating a strong presumption that the filing date is the 
date of invention and implementing a one-year statutory bar. Patent law 
pushes the inventor to file early to increase the likelihood of the patent's 
validity. This incentive to file early will become greater if the United 
States moves to a first-to-file system, currently implemented by almost 
every country's patent system. 
A. LACK OF BARRIERS TO EARLy FILING 
I. No Actual Reduction to Practice Requirement 
A fundamental requirement of patent law is that the act of invention 
must occur prior to patent protection.38 Likewise, an applicant must be 
the inventor of the subject matter claimed by her patent application.39 A 
specific definition of the act of "inventing" is used to determine whether 
the invention requirement is met. The process of invention involves two 
steps-conception and reduction to practice-and is not considered 
completed until the performance of the second step.40 
Conception, the first step of inventing, involves the mental 
formation of the complete invention.4 ' Conception entails more than 
merely identifying a problem that needs to be solved or visualizing an 
abstract solution. The mental picture of the solution must be specific and 
contain enough detail to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art 
38. I WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 9I (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. I890) ("An 
inventor, in the meaning of the Constitution, is one who has himself conceived the fundamental idea of 
the invention .... To him and to him only can a patent lawfully be granted."). 
39· 35 U.S.C. § I02(f) (2oo6) (barring patent protection if the applicant "did not himself invent 
the subject matter sought to be patented"). 
40. See id. § 102(g). Notably these two steps of invention-conception and reduction to practice-
can occur simultaneously. The typical scenario is that a complete formulation of the invention does not 
take place until reduction to practice is completed. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 
F.2d I200, I206 (Fed. Cir. I99I) ("In some instances, an inventor is unable to establish a conception 
until he has reduced the invention to practice through a successful experiment. This situation results in 
a simultaneous conception and reduction to practice."). 
41. "Conception is the 'formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of 
the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice."' Hybritech Inc. v. 
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d I367, I376 (Fed. Cir. Ig86) (quoting I RoBINSON ON PATENTS 
532 (I8go))). 
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(PHOSITA) to make or perform the invention.42 Conception finishes 
with the "exterior expression of the mind of the inventor" in the form of 
a writing, oral communication, or model.43 
There are two ways to reduce an invention to practice and complete 
the final step of inventing. An inventor may actually reduce the invention 
to practice by physically implementing the invention and, in the process, 
demonstrating the invention works as intended.44 Actual reduction to 
practice is taking the conceived invention out of the inventor's head, 
making it exist in real space, and showing that it works.45 
Patent law has long recognized a legal fiction that substitutes for 
actual reduction to practice-constructive reduction to practice.46 An 
invention is considered constructively reduced to practice when the 
invention is described in a patent application that includes a description 
of the invention that meets patent law's disclosure requirements.47 That 
is, the patent application must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § II2, 
paragraph I -adequately describe, enable, and convey the best mode of 
the invention-to count as a reduction to practice.48 
The ability to meet the second step of invention-reduction to 
practice-constructively removes a potential barrier to filing for a patent 
early in the development process. An applicant need only conceive of the 
invention and, by filing for a patent that is valid, she necessarily meets 
the reduction to practice requirement.49 The invention does not need to 
be built or actually implemented, nor does an applicant need to make 
42. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
("Conception is complete only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only 
ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or 
experimentation."); Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that conception 
requires an idea as to the invention's structure and an operative way of making it). 
43· Mergenthaler v. Scudder, II App. D.C. 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1897). This is mainly for proof 
purposes. See Burroughs Wei/come, 40 F.3d at 1228 ("Because it is a mental act, courts require 
corroborating evidence of a contemporaneous disclosure that would enable one skilled in the art to 
make the invention."). 
44· See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d II 57. n69 (Fed. Cir. 2oo6). 
45· See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
46. See, e.g., Warren H. Willner, Origin and Development of the Doctrine of Constructive 
Reduction to Practice, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 618 (1954). 
47· See Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that the application must 
meet the written description requirement for the filed claims to be considered constructive reductions 
to practice); Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (indicating that a patent 
disclosure must meet the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § II2 to constructively reduce to practice a 
particular claim). 
48. 35 U.S.C. § II2 (2oo6) (articulating the disclosure requirements). 
49· See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
("'Constructive reduction to practice' is a legal status unique to the patent art. Unlike the rules for 
scientific publications, which require actual performance of every experimental detail, patent law and 
practice are directed to teaching the invention so that it can be practiced.") 
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sure the invention works for its intended purpose.50 The mental solution 
just needs to be written down with enough specificity and detail to 
disclose the invention and enable others skilled in the art to practice it. 
Other patent doctrines further lower the barrier to meeting the 
invention requirement. The patent application, which serves as a proxy 
for an actual reduction to practice, need only include a level of detail 
needed for a PHOSIT A to practice the invention. This means that 
certain implementation details that would fall within this skill level need 
not be disclosed.5 ' The patent's description of the invention can also have 
holes that are filled with an acceptable level of experimentation. As long 
as the person having skill in the art does not need to engage in "undue" 
experimentation, the patent application has provided enough detail to 
qualify for a constructive reduction to practice and the ultimate 
completion of the process of invention. 52 The description of the invention 
is viewed through this lens-a PHOSITA engaged in reasonable 
experimentation-and therefore does not need to include many of the 
details of the invention's implementation. 
All of these legal constructs combine to minimize the demands on 
the inventor prior to filing. The inventor does not need to actually 
implement or recognize the success of her invention because of the 
constructive reduction to practice doctrine. The flexibility inherent in the 
disclosure requirements-with the patent application supplemented with 
the knowledge of a PHOSIT A and some experimentation -lessens the 
specificity of the inventor's articulation of her invention. The inventor 
need only conceive of the invention and not much more to invent under 
U.S. patent law. 53 
There is one caveat. Since the level of specificity is tied to skill in the 
art and level of experimentation needed, the more unpredictable the 
area of technology, the more that needs to be disclosed.54 Thus, for 
so. See Lawson v. Bruce, 222 F.2d 273, 278 (C.C.P.A. 1955) ("There is no requirement ... that a 
party relying on a constructive reduction to practice to establish priority of invention must show a 
specific working example to support the compound claimed."). 
51. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769,774 (C. C.P.A. 1962). 
52. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("(The specification itself 
need not] necessarily describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, 
for the artisan's knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate 
between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending 
upon the predictability of the art."). 
53· Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 6o (1998) ("The primary meaning of the word 
'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a 
physical embodiment of that idea."). This is why it is often said that "[c]onception is the touchstone of 
inventorship." See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
54· Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1653-54 (2003) 
(noting that the written description requirement is "a sort of 'super-enablement' requirement" in the 
biotechnology field). 
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chemical and biotechnology areas, more information is needed for valid 
specification that includes the required level of implementation detail. 
Accordingly, in order to provide this additional detail, more needs to be 
done by the inventor in these technological arts and the barrier to filing 
early is not as low. 
2. Lax Utility Requirement 
An invention must also meet the utility requirement to gain patent 
protection.55 To meet this requirement, the invention must be capable of 
some beneficial use.56 
As applied, the utility requirement is easy to meet for most 
inventions.57 While the invention must have a beneficial use, the level of 
benefit necessary is very low. Patent law simply requires that the 
invention have some benefit. There is no evaluation as to whether the 
invention is useful enough- that is, whether it will provide a certain 
quantum of benefit for society.58 For example, the invention does not 
need to be commercially viable.59 The utility requirement also does not 
require that the inventor submit test data to "prove" that the invention is 
operable and capable of its intended use.00 The inventor need only 
provide a technical description of the invention that would teach a 
PHOSIT A how to operate the invention.6' In fact, under the current 
patent examination guidelines, examiners must presume operability of 
the invention.62 For most technological areas, the utility requirement is a 
nonrequirement. 
55· 35 U.S.C. § IOI (2006). 
s6. Fuller V. Berger, I20 F. 274. 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (articulating the test for utility as questioning 
whether the invention "is incapable of serving any beneficial end"). 
57· See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., I8S F.3d I364, I366 (Fed. Cir. I999) ("The 
threshold of utility is not high."); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d ISSS. 
I57I (Fed. Cir. I992) ("To violate § IOI the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a 
useful result .... "). 
58. Justice Story articulated the requirement as excluding those inventions that are "injurious to 
the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society." See Lowell v. Lewis, IS F. Cas. IOI8, IOI9 
(C.C.D. Mass. I817) (No. 8s68). However, even this view of utility-excluding only inventions with 
"negative" utility-has lost favor with the courts. See, e.g .. Juicy Whip, I8S F.3d at I366-67 (cataloging 
cases where patents on gambling devices, which are arguably socially harmful, were found to meet the 
utility requirement). 
59· Duffy, supra note IS, at 453 ("Simply put, patent law has no aversion to awarding 
commercially worthless property rights."); Kitch, supra note I2, at 269 ("The patent application need 
not disclose a device or process of any commercial value, only a version of the invention that will 
work."). 
6o. See In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457. 462 (C.C.P.A I956) ("[I)n the usual case where the mode of 
operation alleged can be readily understood and conforms to the known laws of physics and chemistry, 
operativeness is not questioned, and no further evidence is required."). 
61. See I DONALDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 4.04(I) (2009). 
62. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863-{;4 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d I034, 
I038 (Fed. Cir. I985). The presumption is usually only overcome in patents making remarkable claims. 
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This low utility requirement removes another barrier to filing for a 
patent shortly after conception. If patent law required a use of a certain 
commercial or social worth, an inventor would need to take time to 
establish that her invention provides this level of benefit before filing.63 
She would need to find a commercially beneficial use for her invention. 
Then she would need to produce the data necessary to prove that her 
invention actually generated such a benefit. Put simply, an inventor 
would need to further develop her invention and investigate its uses 
before filing for a patent in order to meet such a heightened utility 
requirement. This additional proof is just not required under the current 
utility standard for patentability. 
There is a notable exception to patent law's lax utility requirement. 
In the biology and chemistry fields, patent law has applied a heightened 
utility requirement.64 For inventions in these technology areas, the 
invention must have some "terminal application" and there must be 
proof that the invention can achieve this ultimate use.65 For example, new 
chemicals and the processes that produce them meet the utility 
requirement only if a specific, practical use for the produced chemical 
has been identified.66 In addition, patents claiming pharmaceuticals must 
at least describe the indicators, such as in vitro tests or animal modeling, 
that show the drug's therapeutic efficacy.67 And for expressed sequence 
tags (ESTs) in the biotechnology area, the inventor must identify a 
currently-known function for the EST.68 For these inventions, utility 
means "an immediate, well-defined, real world benefit to the public 
meriting the grant of a patent" that goes beyond mere operability and 
some use.69 
Accordingly, this heightened utility standard stands as an additional 
barrier to early filing in these technological areas. The inventor 
necessarily needs to do more, both in establishing the usefulness of her 
invention and finding the data to prove it. The utility requirement 
invalidates those patents that are filed too early because an ultimate end-
use of the chemical or pharmaceutical has not been established. 
See, e.g., Swartz, 232 F.3d at 864 (affirming the USPTO's determination that a patent claiming cold 
fusion was not operable). 
63. Kitch, supra note 12, at 26g (noting that the lack of a commercial worth requirement allows 
"the applicant [to) proceed from the first positive results to the patent office"). 
64. Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1644-45. 
65. Id. at 1644. 
66. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519,534-35 (r¢6). 
(J?. In re Brana, 51 F. 3d 156o, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
68. In re Fisher 421 F.3d 1365, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
6g. Jd. at 1376. 
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3· Availability of Provisional Applications 
The availability of filing a "provisional application" removes 
another potential barrier to filing early for patent protection. Introduced 
in the United States in 1994, a provisional application is an application 
that is designated to not be examined, but instead acts as a placeholder 
for a nonprovisional (i.e., real) application to be filed not more than 
twelve months later.70 
The significance of provisional applications is two-fold. First, a 
provisional application establishes an application's filing date so that, 
when converted to a nonprovisional application within a year from the 
date of the provisional's filing, the patent application is considered filed 
as of the date of the provisionaV' In turn, a provisional application, by 
giving a patent application as much as a year-earlier filing date, de facto 
adds up to one additional year to the twenty-year patent term.72 That is, 
the nonprovisional patent application's filing date starts the twenty-year 
term clock ticking, but if a provisional is filed, the effective filing date is a 
year earlier without starting the term clock.73 
Provisional applications remove additional barriers to early filing. 
The fees for filing a provisional application are lower than filing a normal 
application.74 This removes some of the cost of filing early. In addition, a 
provisional application does not need to include any patent claims.75 
Claims need only be added when the provisional is converted to an 
application for examination within the one-year window. This lowers the 
costs of filing early even more by removing the need to pay a patent 
attorney to get the patent application completely "in order" and draft 
70. 35 U.S.C. § ru(b) (2oo6) (defining the provisional application). 
71. /d.; id. § II9(e); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(c)(2) (2008); Robert A. Migliorini, Twelve Years Later: 
Provisional Patent Application Filing Revisited, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 437, 441-42 (2007). 
72. Migliorini, supra note 71, at 439 ("The primary purpose of implementing the option for 
provisional application filing was to give U.S. inventors the opportunity to obtain an initial filing date 
that does not serve as the basis from which the 2o-year term of patent protection is measured."). 
73· Changes to Implement 20-Year Patent Term and Provisional Applications, 6o Fed. Reg. 
20195,20205 (Apr. 25, 1995) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. r, 3). 
74· See Migliorini, supra note 7 r, at 444· 
Another benefit of provisional filing is that it may allow an applicant to obtain an earlier 
priority filing date at a relatively low cost then [sic) may be otherwise available if filing non-
provisionally. The filing fee is $roo lower than a non-provisional filing, and more 
importantly, there are no excess claims fees. 
/d. The average attorney fees for preparing a provisional application is $4384 compared to $9412 for a 
relatively complex nonprovisional application on a mechanical invention. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
LAw Assoc., AIPLA REPORT OF THE EcoNOMic SuRVEY 2007, at I-78 to -79 (2007) [hereinafter AIPLA 
REPORT). 
75· 35 U.S.C. § III(b)(2). 
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patent claims.76 The inventor also gets a year to gather the additional 
resources needed to file the actual patent application. 
While facilitating early filing, the information in a provisional is still 
important. In order to enjoy the provisional's filing date, the provisional 
application must fully support the claims included in the nonprovisional 
patent application.77 The claims must be described and enabled by the 
provisional application. Accordingly, the inventor must put some thought 
and time into the drafting of a provisional application for the early filing 
to be worthwhile. But the availability of an early placeholder-which 
gives an inventor another year to both decide whether she wants to 
devote the full resources to filing a patent application and obtain the 
resources needed to file-adds another way the patent system removes 
potential barriers to filing early. 
B. INCENTIVES TO FILE EARLY 
I. Filing Date Is the Presumed Invention Date 
Determining the date of invention is a critical step in deciding 
whether a claimed invention is patentable. An invention's novelty and 
non-obviousness are judged with respect to the date of invention.78 
Everything done before the date of invention is eligible to be "prior art" 
to the claimed invention.79 The prior art is compared to the claimed 
invention to determine whether the invention has been previously 
done-it is anticipated and thus not novd" -or the invention is not a 
large enough technological development over what has already been 
done-it is obvious.8' Put simply, a patent can only be defeated by that 
which was done prior to the invention's creation date. 
It follows that the earlier the date of invention, the more likely an 
invention will be patentable. The earlier the date of invention, the 
smaller the universe of potential prior art. The less prior art available to 
compare to the claimed invention, the more likely the invention is novel 
76. "Because of the numerous challenges presented by patent claim drafting, the Supreme Court 
long ago recognized that a patent specification is one of the most difficult legal documents to draw 
with accuracy." Robert D. Katz & Steven J. Lee, Advanced Claim Drafting and Amendment Writing 
for Chemical Inventions, in SIXTH ANNUAL PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP: ADVANCED CLAIM AND 
AMENDMENT WRITING 335, 339 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course 
Handbook Series No. G4-3977, 1996) (citing Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156 (1S92)). 
77- 35 U.S.C. § III(b)(I). 
7S. See id. § 102(a), (g) (denying patent protection if certain events occur "before the invention"); 
id. § 103(a) (determining obviousness from the perspective of a PHOSITA "at the time the invention" 
was made); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv. 101, 
!06 (2005)· 
79· See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The definition of prior art expands to include activities after the date 
of invention. See id. § 102(b ). 
So. !d. § 102(a). 
Sr. !d. § 103(a). 
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and non-obvious. Essentially, the level of technological progress the 
invention is compared against becomes lower the earlier the date of 
comparison. 
An earlier invention date also benefits an inventor if there is a 
contest as to priority of inventorship. Patent law in the United States 
awards the patent to the first to invent.82 So if there is a contest between 
two inventors, the rights to exclusivity over the invention are essentially 
awarded to the one to invent first. 83 Under these rules, the earlier the 
date of invention, the more likely one is to win a priority contest. 
The filing date is relevant to the date of invention because patent 
law presumes the filing date is the date of invention.84 The earlier the 
filing date, the earlier patent law presumes the invention was created. 
The burden then lies on the USPTO or defendant, depending on the 
venue, to disprove this presumed date of invention.85 And given that the 
filing of a patent application that meets the disclosure requirements 
qualifies as a constructive reduction to practice and evidence of 
conception, overcoming this burden is extremely difficult. 
Just as it is difficult to defeat the presumption and move the 
invention date later in time, it is equally hard to establish an invention 
date earlier than the filing date. Patent law employs a hei~htened 
evidentiary standard to establish an earlier date of conception. There 
must not only be some external evidence of conception at an earlier date, 
there must also be corroboration of this conception.87 Meeting this 
evidentiary burden is difficult. Before the USPTO, an applicant must 
"swear behind" the filing date to get an early date of invention.88 During 
litigation, a patentholder must meet this high standard for proving 
conception.89 The same holds true for priority disputes.90 The difficulty in 
meeting this standard in all of these settings is evidenced by the fact that 
82. See id. § 102(e). 
83. The determination of priority is actually more complex. See id. § ro2(g) (defining the standard 
for determining priority between two inventors of the same technology); Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 
1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (articulating the standard in reverse, noting that "priority of invention goes 
to the first party to reduce an invention to practice unless the other party can show that it was the first 
to conceive of the invention and that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention 
to practice"); ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
440-41 (3d ed. 2002 ). 
84. 37 C.F.R. § r.657(a) (2008); Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(articulating the rebuttable presumption that the filing date is the invention date). 
85. Supra note 84. 
86. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: The "Suggestion 
Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1517, 1585--87. 
87. See Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330; Allen v. Blaisdell, 196 F.2d 527,529 (C.C.P.A. 1952); Cotropia, 
supra note 86. 
88. 37 C.F.R. § I.I3r. 
89. Lora! Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 266 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
90· Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330. 
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in most priority disputes, the earlier filing date wins priority.9' And even 
if the standard for proving an earlier date of invention is met, the process 
of getting there, which relies heavily on testimony and written evidence, 
is costly.92 
In light of the benefits of an early date of invention, the 
presumption assigned to the filing date, and the difficulty of proving an 
earlier date of invention, patent law creates a strong incentive to file 
early. Filing early gives the inventor an early date of invention, which 
constricts the universe of available prior art. And given that it is both 
difficult and costly to prove a date of invention prior to the filing date, 
the inventor knows that the filing date is most likely going to be the date 
of invention. This means that the earlier one files, the more likely one's 
application is valid. 
2. One-Year Statutory Bar to Patentability 
Even if an inventor can prove a date of invention earlier than the 
filing date, the filing date is relevant to another patentability 
requirement-the statutory bar. Section 102(b) renders a patent invalid if 
it claims an invention that was described in a printed publication, in 
public use, or offered for sale more than one year prior to the filing 
date.93 The impact of this statutory bar is that activities after the date of 
invention, but more than one year prior to the filing date, can render the 
patent invalid. These activities that qualify as prior art under § 102(b) 
can include publications or offers for sale from the inventor herself that 
occur more than one year before filing. 94 
Filing date, therefore, means more than getting an early invention 
date. The earlier the filing date, the earlier in time the one-year window 
exists. And, as noted above, the older the prior art compared to the 
invention, the less likely the prior art renders the invention anticipated or 
obvious. An earlier filing date also narrows the window between the date 
of invention and the filing date. The smaller this window, the less 
91. See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 
54 HASTINGs L.J. 1299, 1317 (2003) ("Indeed, our analysis suggests that in more than half of the cases 
in which the senior party won a priority contest, and more than a third of total cases, the senior party 
needed to do no more than prove its filing date, suggesting that the entire proceeding was a waste of 
time."). But Lemley and Chien did find that, while first filers won in a majority of USPTO and district 
court proceedings, junior parties fared better on appeal. /d. at 1312-r3 (including possible 
explanations for such a discrepancy). 
92. See Woodland Trust v. Aowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(detailing the factors for evaluating the physical evidence and oral testimony required to establish 
corroboration). 
93· 35 U.S.C. § ro2(b) (2oo6) (invalidating a claim if the claimed "invention was patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, 
more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States"). 
94· See id. 
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publications and offers for sale of the invention that can take place more 
than one year before filing and thus invalidate the patent under 
§ 102(b ).95 This is particularly true for prior art created by the inventor, 
who is unable to publish or offer for sale the invention before she 
actually conceives of the invention. Early filing, therefore, provides the 
additional benefit of making a patent less susceptible to a statutory-bar 
challenge. The earlier an inventor files, the less exposed her invention is 
to statutory bar-oriented prior art.96 
The statutory bar, by both making activities after the date of 
invention and the inventor's own activities relevant to patentability, 
magnifies the benefits of filing early. And this strong incentive to file 
early created by the statutory bar is purposeful. One of the explicit 
rationales behind the statutory bar is to push inventors to file early.97 
While the United States employs a first-to-invent system, it still 
encourages inventors to file for patent protection sooner rather than 
later .98 The statutory bar serves this function, preventing inventors from 
enjoying the benefits of the patented technology, via commercial 
development and public use, outside the twenty-year exclusivity period 
that starts at the filing date.99 
C. MovE TO FIRST-TO-FILE SYSTEM MAGNIFIES INCENTIVES TO FILE EARLY 
The United States is unique in that its patent system awards patent 
rights to the first to invent, not the first to file a patent application. 
Almost all other countries utilize a first-to-file system-the first inventor 
to file for a patent, even if they are the second to invent, is awarded the 
patent rights to the invention. 100 
The United States is currently contemplating moving to a first-to-
file system. 101 If such a change takes place, the incentives to file early 
95- MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 83, at 541-42 ("As the inventor continues to delay filing, more 
and more material becomes potentially relevant under § ro2(b ). "). 
96. /d. (noting that an inventor who files within one year of inventing "has nothing to fear from 
§ 102(b) because no references qualify under§ ro2(b) that do not also qualify under§ ro2(a)"). 
97· 2 DoNALDS. CHISUM. CHISUM ON PATENTS§ 6.01 (2008). 
98. See id. There is some flexibility in the form of the experimental-use exception. See, e.g., 
Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1365-{j() (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
99· See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (noting that one of the purposes of 
§ 102 is to "confin[e] the duration of the monopoly to the statutory term"); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) r, 19 (1829) ("A provision, therefore, that should withhold from an inventor the privilege 
of an exclusive right, unless he should, as early as he should allow the public use, put the public in 
possession of his secret, and commence the running of the period, that should limit that right; would 
not be deemed unreasonable."). 
roo. See Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the United 
States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality and 
Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J.L. Scr. & TECH. 757, 764-{;5 (2oo6). 
IOI. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, s. 515, I I rth Cong. § 2 (2oog). 
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become magnified. 102 No longer will it just be the presumption that the 
filing date is the invention date pushing an inventor to file early. Instead, 
the inventor will file early because the earlier she files, the more likely 
she will be the first to file. In a sense, a first-to-file system replicates the 
early filing incentives created by the statutory bar, but without the one-
year grace period. The inventor needs to file early because the filing 
date, not the date of invention, determines priority amongst competing 
inventors. Filing as early as possible-which would be at the time of 
conception-is the best course to protect one's right to patent exclusivity 
over the invention he or she created. 
II. PREVIOUSLY ARTICULATED BENEFITS TO EARLY FILING 
Many have recognized and applauded the early-filing nature of the 
patent system. Edmund Kitch, in his Prospect Theory, is probably the 
most notable champion of early filing.' 03 He argues that early filing both 
facilitates commercialization of the invention and helps to minimize 
wasteful races to invent and patent. 104 John Duffy recently built upon 
Kitch's work and made the observation that, by incentivizing early filing, 
the patent system causes patents to expire earlier than they would 
otherwise. 105 These three previously articulated benefits to early filing are 
explored below, including the criticisms lodged against these positions. 
A. FACILITATING COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE INVENTION 
Edmund Kitch, in articulating his Prospect Theory of patent law, 
identified the early-filing nature of the patent system as one of the tools 
that furthered the prospect nature of the system. Kitch's Prospect Theory 
views the patent system as granting exclusivity over prospects-
"particular opportunit[ies] to develop a known technological 
possibility" -and facilitating their development. "l6 By requiring inventors 
to file early, and in turn to receive protection early in the development 
process, the patent system gives inventors patent protection at the 
beginning of the technology's development.">? Protection at this early 
102. Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 100, at 772. Given the results of Lemley and Chien's 
empirical study on inventorship disputes, the U.S. system already de facto acts as a first-to-file system. 
See Lemley & Chien, supra note 91, at 1312-13. 
103. See Kitch, supra note 12, at 265-{)6, 278-79 (setting forth the Prospect Theory of patents). 
104. !d. at 269-70. 
105. Duffy, supra note 15, at 444· 
1o6. Kitch, supra note 12, at 266. 
107. !d. at 269 ("The second important feature of the patent system which makes it function as a 
prospect system are rules which force and permit application early in the development process."). 
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stage facilitates and maximizes the efficient development and 
improvement of the patented invention. 108 
Kitch catalogs the many advantages of granting exclusivity early in 
an invention's development. Early protection allows the patent owner to 
coordinate the development and improvement of the patented 
technology,"l9 minimizes duplication of efforts amongst multiple 
developers,"o and facilitates the exchange of information."! Providing 
protection early also gives the inventor the necessary breathing room to 
further develop her invention. 112 She can share information about her 
technology with others without fear of misappropriation. 113 By obtaining 
patent exclusivity early in development, the inventor can also save on 
costly expenditures to maintain the secrecy of her invention."4 
The Prospect Theory's premise that patenting facilitates 
commercialization is not without its critics. Robert Merges and Richard 
Nelson argue that rivalrous, as opposed to coordinated, development 
better facilitates the sequential improvement of invented technologies. us 
Merges and Nelson contend that they can present empirical evidence 
that rivalry produces rapid technical advancement, while the granting of 
broad patent rights typically suppresses such progress."6 Mark Lemley 
comes to a similar conclusion, questioning whether "a single company is 
better positioned than the market to make efficient use of an idea."117 
There is good reason that the market, not an exclusive controller, 
produces better development and improvement of a patented idea. 
Furthermore, as Lemley points out, "[c]reators are often terrible 
managers" and "frequently misunderstand the significance of their own 
invention and the uses to which it can be put.""8 
However, even Lemley agrees that in certain technological fields, 
such as pharmaceutical development, patent protection may play a 
crucial role in development post-patenting. In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, "control over subsequent development is a necessary 
108. /d. at 266. 
109. /d. at 276. 
IIO. /d. at 278-79. 
II 1. /d. at 277-78. 
II2. /d. at 276-77 ("[T]he patent owner has an incentive to make investments to maximize the 
value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable 
information appropriable by competitors."'). 
II3. !d. at 277-78. 
II4. /d. at 279. 
liS. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839,872-77 (1990). 
u6. /d. at 877. 
1 17· Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 129, 135-37 (providing examples of his argument under copyright law). 
uS. /d. at 137. 
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part of the incentive to produce the pioneering invention in the first 
place.""9 The need for this control over development is due to the high 
costs associated with bringing a developed drug to market.' 2" Exclusivity 
from development to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval is 
needed to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in the initial-
stage research."' 
Notably, nothing in Merges and Nelson's or Lemley's critiques 
specifically discredits the benefits of an early filing system. Their 
disagreement is with the Prospect Theory in general, not the legitimacy 
of an early filing regime. The critiques focus on the question of the 
breadth of the patent right, not the timing of the grant. They critique 
Kitch's conclusion that central control promotes technological progress. 
They say nothing about the stage of development in which control is 
given. While these arguments have some applicability to the early filing 
nature of the patent system, they are not direct rebuttals. 122 
In addition, in this back and forth, no one really questions patent 
law's need to provide protection at some time short of the moment of full 
commercialization. Failure to provide protection before this point would 
severely impact the ex ante incentives to engage in the basic development 
patent law attempts to encourage. 123 The farther down the development 
chain patent protection attaches, the more uncertain a potential inventor 
is that she can eventually gain exclusive protection to recoup research 
and development costs. 124 Erecting patent rules that disallow filing for 
patent protection until very late in the development game may deter 
inventing altogether. This, in turn, would affect commercialization 
because the invention would never be created in the first place. So while 
there is nothing close to consensus regarding Kitch's Prospect Theory, 
there is at least some consensus as to the positive relationship between 
early filing and the commercialization of the patented invention. 
II9. ld. at 141. 
120. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1095--96. 
121. ld. 
122. For example, one could imagine an early filing system that provides narrow rights and 
therefore allows rivalrous development and decentralized control of improvements to the originally 
patented technology. 
123. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCfURE OF INTELLECfUAL 
PROPERTY LAw 294 (2003) ("The standard rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of 
enabling the benefits of research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and 
technological progress."); CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAw oF PATENTS 28-29 (2008) (describing the ex ante 
incentive-to-invent theory of patent law.) 
124. See NARD, supra note 123, at 29; Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent 
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1994) (noting that it is important to recognize the primary problem 
that the patent system solves: "This problem, often called the 'appropriability problem,' is that, if a 
firm could not recover the costs of invention because the resulting information were available to all, 
then we could expect a much lower and indeed suboptimal level of innovation."). 
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B. MINIMIZING WASTEFUL PATENT RACES 
Y oram Barzel recognized that patent rights should be awarded 
earlier rather than later to avoid wasteful races to invent. 125 Barzel 
observed that the act of inventing a particular technology was a common 
resource susceptible to the "common pool" problem causing multiple 
firms to engage in inefficient races to invent that dissipate all of the 
invention's "special economic value."126 While Barzel's suggested 
solution was patent auctions, 127 Kitch built upon Barzel's observations 
and offered the Prospect Theory as an explanation of how the patent 
system, by pushing inventors to file early, solved the wasteful patent race 
problem. 128 The prospect aspect of the patent system-awarding broad 
patent rights early in development-reduced socially wasteful patent 
races by shortening them. 129 The earlier patent law ends the race between 
multiple researchers seeking to invent the same technology, the fewer 
resources are then devoted to a duplicative effort. 130 And, as previously 
mentioned, the prospect nature of the patent system also reduces 
wasteful postpatenting races by allowing the patent holder to coordinate 
the commercialization and improvement of the invention. 131 
Yet several scholars question early filing's ability to reduce the 
waste created by patent races. Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith 
wrote a reply to Kitch's Prospect Theory article in which they accepted 
the postpatenting benefits of patent exclusivity but concluded that such 
gains would only intensify the early race to patent.132 McFetridge and 
Smith argued that while the race may end earlier under the prospect view 
of the patent, the race still exists at the early stage of development and is 
more intense because that much more is at stake.133 Waste is not 
eliminated, but simply produced over a shorter, earlier period under the 
patent system's early filing rules. 134 Such early, intense competition then 
dissipates all of the rents from the invention at the conception stage.135 
Duffy recently echoed McFetridge and Smith's concerns, seconding that 
"by increasing efficiency of post-patent investments in developing the 
125. Yoram Barzel. Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 34R, 352 n.II (1968). 
126. /d. at 349· 
127. /d. at353 n.11. 
128. Kitch, supra note 12, at 269-70. 
129. /d. at 276-79. 
130. /d. at 265~6. 
131. /d. at 278--79. 
132. Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects and Economic Surplus: A 
Comment, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 197, 198 (1g8o). 
133. /d. at 1g8--201. 
134. See id. at 198. 
135. /d. at 203; Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 305, 316-17 (1992). 
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technology, the prospect features of the patent system will merely shift 
rent-dissipating patent races backward in time." 136 
Others respond that such races are not necessarily wasteful. 137 Early 
races to invent are not inevitably duplicative. Two companies may be 
attempting to solve a given problem and, at the end of the race, produce 
two viable solutions. 138 These alternatives can be, on net, socially 
beneficial because their presence may reduce the price of the inventions 
produced and provide consumers with a greater selection of products. 139 
Such races can also have unrelated positive spillover effects.140 A 
company who loses the race may, in the process of inventing, make an 
unintended discovery that solves another societal problem or assists in 
the development of that company's next invention. 141 
Given the strengths of the critiques, both with respect to whether 
early filing actually reduces wasteful patent races and whether races are 
truly wasteful, the benefits of early filing associated with patent races are 
questionable. However, recognition of the interplay between filing 
timing and patent races is necessary when evaluating the timing of patent 
filing. The timing of filing definitely has an effect, at least in some cases, 
on the length of the race to invent and, in turn, the benefits and 
drawbacks of patent races discussed above then become relevant. 
C. CAUSING EARLIER DEDICATION TO THE PUBLIC 
Even if the early filing nature of the patent system does not reduce 
wasteful patent races, an earlier finish line may still be beneficial. Duffy 
reframed the critique of the Prospect Theory as a question of "not 
whether rents will be dissipated, but how they will be dissipated. "142 Duffy 
I36. Duffy, supra note IS, at 443· 
I37· SeeR. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies 
of Control, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 99S, IOOI n.I9 (2003) ("There is a rich literature (dealing principally 
with patents) suggesting that an analogous tragedy may result from, for example, patent races-where 
multiple parties 'race' to create a patentable invention, thereby reducing or eliminating the benefits of 
the advance through unnecessarily redundant effort."); Suzanne Scotchmer, Incentives to Innovate, in 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DlcrJONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 273, 27S (Peter Newman ed., I998) ("The 
literature has produced two views of patent races: that they inefficiently duplicate costs, and that they 
efficiently encourage higher aggregate investment."). 
138. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 400 (I988) (indicating that a 
patent race loser may develop another, beneficial product); Grady & Alexander, supra note I3S, at 
3I6-21. 
139. See TIROLE, supra note I38; Grady & Alexander, supra note I3S, at 3I6-2I. 
I40. Giovanni De Fraja, Strategic Spillovers in Patent Races, I 1 INT'L J. INDUS. 0RG. I39, I40 
(I993); Jennifer F. Reinganum, A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive 
Behavior, so EcoNOMETRICA 67I, 6?I (I982). 
141. Supra note I40. 
I42. Duffy, supra note IS, at 443, 47s-8o (analogizing early patenting to a Demsetzian auction-a 
government-run auction where each franchise can bid in terms of price and quality of service for 
exclusive access to consumers). 
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observed that early filing means early expiration-putting the patented 
technology in the public domain earlier. 143 And since earlier filing means 
that patent protection begins before commercialization occurs, the 
patentholder has less time to exploit the patented technology, 
"diminish[ing] the patentee's rents." 144 The patent system, by 
encouraging early filing, places the invention into the public domain 
sooner. 145 Society gets to enjoy the benefits of the invention sooner, 
without the costs of exclusive control. 
Michael Abramowicz critiqued Duffy's theory, acknowledging that 
the patent expires sooner but observing that this fact raises another 
concern: underdevelopment of the patented technology.146 The earlier in 
the development process an inventor files for patent protection, the more 
uncertain and, in turn, unlikely it is that the inventor will actually 
commercialize the invention. 147 Patent protection, by definition, gives the 
patent holder the favorable option of delaying commercialization until 
such an action is clearly beneficial to the patent holder.148 This creates the 
possibility that the patent holder will never exercise the 
commercialization option during the patent period, instead waiting for 
such an option exercise to become more favorable. 149 This lack of 
commercialization gets the invention into the public domain quicker, but 
makes it more likely the technology is never fully developed. 150 
Abramowicz argued that, on net, a pure prospect system with early filing 
and fixed patent terms creates the real possibility of underdevelopment 
of the patented invention. 151 
Ill. COSTS OF AN EARLY FILING DOCTRINE 
While there has been discussion about the merits of an early-filing 
patent system, the discussion has been mostly one-sided, with no one 
fully exploring the costs of an early-filing system. In particular, no one 
has examined the lack of information and great uncertainty surrounding 
the invention at the time of early filing. Nor has there been a discussion 
of the effect this lack of information and uncertainty has on which patent 
applications are filed, how many are filed, and the use of such 
applications once they issue as patents. 
143. I d. at 444· 
144. Jd. 
145· I d. at 468. 
146. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1079. 
147· ld. 
148. Id. at 107')--80. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. Id. at ro81--82. 
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This Part fills these holes in the discourse. It begins with a 
description of the technological development process. There is an 
enormous amount of technical and market information generated as 
development proceeds towards the final goal of commercial sale. And 
the amount of information grows as development progresses. 
Accordingly, the earlier in the development process a patent is filed, the 
less available information there will be about the invention and, more 
importantly, how the invention will be used commercially. This lack of 
information at the time of early filing leads to uncertainty about the 
invention's worth. When compared to the low costs of patenting and the 
high, yet probabilistic, potential value of patent protection, inventors err 
on the side of filing a patent application on the invention at this early 
stage of development. Then, in reaction to the additional information 
that becomes available after early filing, inventors file for additional 
patent protection by using mechanisms such as continuations, 
continuations-in-part, and new applications. All of this leads to overfiling 
by the inventor to compensate for the lack of invention information at 
the early stage of development and to capture the new information 
encountered at later stages. This combination-early filing with little 
information and follow-up filing to capture new information-
exacerbates the patent system's most recognized problems. It decreases 
the quality of patent examination, leads to the underdevelopment of 
patented technologies, promotes patent trolls, and creates unclear patent 
boundaries. 
A. EARLY PATENT FILING IN THE CONTEXT OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
The filing of a patent application does not occur in a vacuum. It is 
typically the offshoot of a technology development process. 152 A certain 
amount of development occurs prior to the filing of the patent 
application and then, presumably, development continues after filing. 153 
Even if the inventor chooses to discontinue development after filing, 
time marches on, producing more information about the technologies 
that affect the invention and the potential market for the invention. 
The question is: where does early filing place the decision to patent 
in the process of technological development? To define this time period, 
this Part utilizes two concepts. First, the typical new technology 
development process is described. Then, the level of technical and 
market knowledge required by patent law prior to filing is used to 
152. SeeM. HENRY HEINES, PATENTS FOR BusiNESS 1-8 (2007). 
153. Development post-patenting is not a given, particularly if the patent is filed early. See infra 
Part III.C.2. 
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identify the point in time where the filing decision occurs during the 
technological development. As a result, the amount of information 
known and not known at filing becomes readily ascertainable. 
I. Development Process 
Development processes vary amongst companies in a given industry 
and vary even more between industries. 154 Development processes also 
vary in relation to the sophistication and resources of the company or 
individual engaged in new technological development. 155 There are, 
however, commonalities in such processes.'56 The process of development 
usually occurs in loosely defined stages, starting with an initial "idea" 
stage and ending with the commercial launch of a specific product or 
service. 157 The goal is that each stage generates more technical and 
market information about a potential product configuration, so that 
decisions can be made as to which product configurations to continue 
developing and which to abandon because of discovered technical and/or 
market issues.'58 The process, hopefully, results in a commercialized 
product that is technologically feasible and best meets market demand. 159 
The ideas for product configurations that begin most technology 
development processes are usually very general.•oo The product ideas rna~ 
be in response to a market demand-ideas for "market-pull" products.' • 
For example, there may be a recognized market need for a smaller cell 
phone or a cure for a particular form of cancer and a company might try 
154. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1581-89 (noting the diverse nature of innovation across 
technological industries). 
ISS· For example, some companies are very structured in their development processes, using 
formalistic development processes such as the traditional STAGE-GATE or PACE process. See, e.g., 
Greg M. Ajamian & Peter A. Koen, Technology Stage-Gate: A Structured Process for Managing High-
Risk New Technology Projects, in THE PDMA ToOLBOOK FOR NEw PRODUcr DEVELOPMENT 267 (Paul 
Belliveau et al. eds., 2002). 
I 56. See RoBERT G. COOPER, WINNING AT NEw PRODUCfS 35-37 (I986) (reporting on the "number 
of underlying themes and recurring messages" that emerge from studying multiple companies' new-
technology development experiences). 
157· See MERLE CRAWFORD & ANTHONY DIBENEDETTO, NEW PRODUCfS MANAGEMENT 26-33 (8th 
ed. 2oo6) (describing the "phases" of new product development); Robert G. Cooper, A Process Model 
for Industrial New Product Development, IEEE TRANSACfiONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT., Feb. 1983, at 2, 
2-11 (articulating a seven stage development process). 
158. See CooPER, supra note I 56, at 4<)-63 (describing both the technical and market information 
generated at each stage of the development process). The term "product configuration" is used loosely 
to label a technical variation of a product or service that is the part of a new-technology development 
process. 
I 59· See CRAWFORD & DI BENEDETTO, supra note I57, at 33 (noting that the process is really "an 
evolving product, or better, an evolving concept that, at the end, if it is successful, becomes a product" 
(emphasis omitted)). 
I6o. See CooPER, supra note I 56, at 49 (describing the idea "stage" of development). 
I6I. /d. (noting that "market-pull ideas" are "generated by the marketplace-a competitor's new 
product, recognition of unsatisfied customers' needs, or direct requests from customers"). 
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to respond by developing a new product. The ideas may also be 
prompted by a new, but not-yet-applied technology-ideas for 
"technology-push" productS.162 A new water-resistant material may be 
discovered and development's focus is finding a product that could use 
this new technology to meet a consumer demand. From this initial 
product-idea brainstorming, a set of possible product configurations are 
selected that have potential and then a preliminary assessment is made of 
each of them. 163 This evaluation continues, with each stage yielding more 
information about the initial product ideas and flushing out particulars in 
response to each wave of investigation. 164 This progression of 
development seeks to generate and then apply two types of 
information- technical and market information. 165 
a. Technical Information Generated 
A potential product's technol~ical feasibility is the main focus of 
the technical side of development. 1 A product's initial technical make-
up is defined and then, in order to achieve the required consistency and 
adequateness in the product's operation, more technical information 
about how the product works is generated. 167 The product's technical 
feasibility is eventually explored through experimentation, prototyping, 
and other real-world feasibility testing. 168 Throughout this process, the 
actual technical specification of the product constantly changes in 
response to success, or failure, of certain technical configurations. IfxJ 
Questions of technical feasibility also include how to produce and 
distribute the product efficiently. In order to make commercialization 
worthwhile, a product is usually modified technically to maximize the use 
of production and distribution methods. 170 Issues concerning the 
162. !d. (identifying "technology-push ideas" as those "generated by research or a serendipitous 
discovery"). 
163. /d. at 55-57 ("Preliminary assessment is the first stage at which significant resources are spent 
to gather information regarding the feasibility of a project."). 
164. These later "stages" of development can include a concept definition stage, a development 
stage, a testing stage, and a trial stage. /d. at 57-63. 
165. Id. 
166. See Emmett W. Eldred & Michael E. McGrath, Commercializing New Techno/ogy-1, REs.-
TECH. MGMT., Jan-Feb. 1997, at 41, 42-44 (discussing the targeted technology feasibility point (TFP) 
for new technology development). Technical uncertainty is usually very high at the beginning of any 
new technology development. /d. at 42. 
167. /d. AT 42-44. 
168. See TOM KELLY, THE ART OF INNOVATION 103-o6 (2001) (emphasizing that "doing"-such as 
building prototypes-is crucial to fully developing innovations); STEFAN H. THOMKE, ExPERIMENTATION 
MATTERS 23-25 (2003) (noting how experimentation generates technical information and reduces 
technical uncertainty); Cooper, supra note 157, at 2-II (describing the later stages of product 
development, including the development, testing, and trial stages, all of which take a concept and use 
tools such as prototyping to generate more technical information about a potential new product). 
169. Cooper, supra note 157, at 2-II. 
qo. See THOMKE, supra note 168, at 25 (discussing the uncertainty in achieving large, cost-effective 
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integration of the product into larger products or processes are also 
answered during development. 171 A product may also need to work well 
with complementary technologies. Such integration or companion use 
requires further definition of the technical construction of the product. 172 
There is also a feedback between market information and technical 
information regarding the product during development. As the market 
becomes better known and defined, technical changes occur. 173 The 
product's configuration changes to better meet customer demand by 
either providing preferred functionality or getting production costs to a 
desired price point. 174 
b. Market Information Generated 
Usually in parallel with the technical development of a product, the 
market for the product is explored. 175 Market analysis may start with 
small, targeted studies-both to better define the potential markets and 
to get feedback on the current technical version of the product. 176 As 
development continues and the product becomes more defined, the 
market studies become more elaborate and occur on a wider scale. 177 The 
target market becomes better defined. 178 Possible competitors and 
market position become clearly identified. 179 
The feedback between market and technical information also 
occurs, this time with newly acquired technical information producing 
additional market information. Better understanding of what is 
technically feasible and the likely price and delivery date shapes the 
production of a new technology). 
171. See CLIVE L. DYM & PATRICK LITTLE, ENGINEERING DESIGN: A PROJECT-BASED INTRODUCTION 92 
(2d ed. 2004) (identifying the need to define "interface performance specifications" and ensure they 
are met). 
172. See id. (noting that interfacing technologies with other systems is "extremely hard in 
practice," and thus it is helpful to get as much information about how the various technologies 
interact). 
I73· See CooPER, supra note 156, at 58-62 (describing how market studies and consumer testing 
influence the "design requirements for what constitutes a better product"). 
174. See id. 
175. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for ,~.".1arket Experbnentation, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 337, 342-43 (2oo8) (describing the field of market experimentation and arguing 
there should be some intellectual property protection for activities). 
176. See CooPER, supra note 156, at 54-57 (suggesting such quick initial marketing analysis as a 
targeted phone survey). 
177. /d. at 57--63 (including in such larger scale market testing a pilot production run where the 
product is made and sold in a test market). 
178. See id. 
179· See, e.g., CHARLES W. LAMB, JR. ET AL., MARKETING 337-38 (8th ed. 2006); JAMES M. MORGAN & 
JEFFREY K. LIKER, THE TOYOTA PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 125-31 (2006) (documenting the 
development of the Toyota Prius); Cooper, supra note 157, at 8 (describing the "Preliminary market 
assessment" stage of development where information is collected on market size and market 
segments). 
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market for the potential product. •&o This technical information influences 
what the target market is, the level of demand, and the resulting profit. '8 ' 
The same effect occurs with technical information about other products 
which the product in development is going to be integrated with or is 
complementary to. '82 As the technical composition of these external 
products changes, so too does the market for the product being 
developed. '83 For example, if it turns out the product is not as technically 
compatible with a complementary technology, that lack of technical fit 
narrows the market for the product. Finally, the availability of a 
prototype helps generate market information-giving something for 
focus groups to put their hands on and provide feedback as to their likes 
and dislikes of a given product configuration. '84 . 
The development process and, in particular, the progressively 
increasing amount of technical and market information, is depicted 
graphically below in Figure r. '85 
FIGURE I: DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
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r8o. See Robert G. Cooper & Elko J. Kleinschmidt, An Investigation into the New Product Process: 
Steps, Deficiencies, and Impact, 3 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 71, 73-76 (1986) (observing that in 
over 250 new product launches, seventy-five percent included an initial market assessment and twenty-
five percent included a detailed marketing study). 
r8r. See LAMB, supra note 179, at 339-40; Cooper, supra note 157, at 9 (discussing the end of the 
concept stage of development, where market studies are done to "gauge ... market acceptance of the 
new product: interest, liking, preference, and intent to purchase"). 
r82. See CRAWFORD & Dr BENEDETTO, supra note 157, at 71-72 (discussing how "technology 
familiarity" with "existing platforms" influences new product design). 
r83. See LAMB ET AL., supra note 179, at 347 (mentioning compatibility of a new product as one of 
five influencing factors on the product's market). 
184. See KELLY, supra note r68, at 103-00. 
r85. See CooPER, supra note 156, at 54-57; Cooper, supra note 157, at 9 (describing the use of a 
prototype to do consumer market testing). 
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The technical and market information, shown in Figure I, increases 
as the development proceeds towards the goal of the commercial launch 
of the product. The dotted lines delineate the stages of development. In 
each stage, starting with an idea stage and ending in commercialization, 
the number of dots-the potential product configurations-decreases as 
certain configurations become identified as not being commercially 
viable. The dots that do make it to the next stage grow bigger because 
more information is known about that particular product's 
configurations. This growth in technical and market information is 
represented graphically as a dot larger than the previous stage's dot. 
2. Lack of Information at the Time of Early Filing 
Viewed in the context of the technological development process, the 
lack of technical and market information at the time of early filing 
becomes apparent. The standards for patentability require very little 
technical information prior to filing and essentially no market 
information. And, as previously discussed, patent law incentivizes 
inventors to file shortly after these standards are met, meaning that filing 
occurs with little invention information. 186 
Patent law requires only a concrete and specific conceptualization of 
the invention prior to filing. 187 To be sure, the invention must be more 
than just an idea. 188 And an inventor must communicate enough specific 
information in the patent application to enable others to build and 
operate the invention without undue experimentation. 189 There is also a 
base requirement that the invention be essentially operable. 11j0 But patent 
law does not require an actual, working embodiment. 191 Patent law also 
explicitly assumes the need for more experimentation after filing to 
actually implement the invention.192 This means that when patenting 
becomes an option, only a minimal amount of technical feasibility work 
must be done. 193 
Furthermore, patent law explicitly does not require "a perfected, 
commercially viable embodiment." 194 The invention does not need to be 
in commercial form. 195 It does not need to operate at the level of 
186. See supra Part I.A.r. 
187. See supra Part I.A.r. 
188. See supra Part I.A.r. 
189. See supra Part I.A. r. 
190. See supra Part I.A.2. 
191. See supra Part I.A.r. 
192. The experimentation must simply not be undue. See Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms., 
Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
193. Kitch, supra note 12, at 27o-7r. 
194. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
195. See supra Part I.A.r. 
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consistency demanded by commercial use.'96 This low requirement plays 
out in practice. "In general, few patented inventions are an immediate 
commercial success. Rather, most inventions require further 
development to achieve commercial success."'97 Certainly this is not the 
case for all inventions at the time of filing.' 98 But most patenting occurs at 
the precommercialization stage. 
The patent rules require even less market information prior to filing. 
In fact, knowledge of the potential market is not required prior to 
filing. '99 The utility requirement does not judge the commercial viability 
of the invention, even for those technology areas that are subjected to a 
heightened requirement."'() Most likely, the inventor has a general idea of 
the need for the particular solution to which the invention is directed. 
However, if the invention is a technology-push invention, as opposed to 
market-pull, the inventor may lack even this minimal market information 
and have the sole goal of creating a new technology.201 
This means that at the time of early filing, the inventor does not 
necessarily have any understanding of the market for the invention. The 
inventor does not know what the possible cash flow is from 
commercializing the invention. 202 There is little to no information about 
the composition of the market, the demand in the market, the particular 
features wanted by the market, or the price sensitivity of the market.203 
Essentially, at the time of early filing, there is little information about the 
exact specifications the market wants and how profitable it would be to 
offer such an invention. 
Accordingly, if early filing is placed in the context of Figure I above, 
early filing would take place at one of the initial, early stages of 
development (located in the left portion of the Figure I). Filing decisions 
would be made when the potential product configurations (inventions) 
are numerous and undeveloped. That is, early filing occurs in stages with 
a high number of small dots. 
Possible exceptions to the general lack of technical and market 
information at the time of early filing are those inventions for which 
patent law requires more technical information. Such areas are chemistry 
196. See supra Part I.A. I. 
197. CFMT, 349 F. 3d at 1340. 
198. Even Kitch admits that "(m]any inventions, including many important ones, are patented in a 
commercially significant form." See Kitch, supra note 12, at 271. 
199. !d. at 27o--71. 
200. As Kitch puts it, all that is required is an invention "that works." See id. at 27o--71. 
201. See, e.g., CooPER, supra note 156, at 49 (defining the difference between technology-push and 
market -pull ideas). 
202. Eduardo S. Schwartz, Patents and R&D as Real Options, 33 EcoN. NoTES 23, 24 (2004) 
(identifying estimated cash flow as one of the uncertainties at the time of patenting). 
203. See CRAWFORD & Dl BENEDETTO, supra note 157, at 3o--34. 
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and biology, where patent law applies heightened enablement and utility 
requirementS.204 This means that applications filed on inventions in these 
areas are further along in development when patenting is sought. More 
technical information is required-evidence of actual use of the 
invention and a definitive end-use application.205 And, even if the law 
does not require market information for chemical or biological 
inventions, lo6 some market information is likely generated prior to filing 
because such information is typically produced in parallel with technical 
development-'"7 So, just as there is more technical information on 
chemical and biological invention prior to filing, there is also likely more 
market information prior to filing. 
3· Resulting Uncertainty 
This lack of technical and market information at early filing 
generates uncertainty about the future value of the invention and, in 
tum, the value of the patent-holder's right of exclusivity.">B There is 
technical uncertainty-unknowns about the invention's true technical 
viability, the cost and timing of production, and, ultimately, its technical 
composition come launch date. There is even more market uncertainty-
unknowns regarding market composition, demand, price tolerances, and 
ultimate profitability of commercializing the invention. 
This uncertainty means that the earlier an inventor files, the wider 
the range of possibilities of the future value of the invention. Referring 
204. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to 
Biotechnological Inventions. 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615,617 (1998); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property 
Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 834-35 (1999); 
Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements 
Under 35 U.S. C.§ II2 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1262 (2000). 
205. Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1644-45. 
206. See Duffy, supra note 15, at 453 n.53 (giving examples of where the utility requirement could 
be met for a biotechnology invention, even if the invention has no commercial value). 
207. See CooPER, supra note 156, at so-63. That is, as they obtain more technical information about 
the new technology, they also get more market information. Marketing information is generated while 
proceeding technically for a very practical reason-companies who are making decisions to spend 
more resources to nail down the technical attributes of a given product want to make sure that each 
additional dollar spent is worthwhile. 
208. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1075 ("Someone who owns a patent cannot be sure how 
profitable commercialization of the patent will be or even how much it will cost to complete the 
commercialization process."). Abramowicz makes this observation based on Shaun Martin and Frank 
Partnoy's "Patents as Options" theory./d. at 1073 n.23 (citing Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Patents 
as Options, Videotape Presentation at the Washington University School of Law Conference on 
Commercializing Innovation (Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://law.wustl.edu/CRIE/index.asp?id=I737). 
Martin and Partnoy analogize patent rights to real options, particularly a call option- the ability to 
decide at a future date to exercise the patent exclusivity option by commercializing the claimed 
invention or asserting the exclusivity right via litigation. /d. at 1073-74. The Author has expanded on 
this analogy. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CoRP. L. II27 
(2009)· 
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back to Figure r, each dot represents a potential product configuration, 
and thus a potential invention, upon which a patent may be filed. At the 
beginning of the development process, the lack of information makes it 
difficult to know whether a particular invention-a specific dot-will be 
the one that eventually becomes commercialized. That is, whether the 
invention has commercial value and, in turn, whether exclusivity over 
that invention-the patent-will have value."'9 As time goes on-and 
development continues-more technical and market information is 
generated. This additional information reduces the uncertainty because 
nonviable inventions are abandoned and those inventions that remain 
are closer to commercialization, and thus their worth becomes clearer. 210 
This increase in certainty with the passage of time even occurs if the 
inventor stops developing. This is because invention information can 
come from external sources, such as technical changes of a 
complementary technology or production process or market changes due 
to variations in consumer demand for the invention's technological area. 
B. COMPENSATION FOR LACK OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY BY 
0VERFILING 
The lack of information and great uncertainty at the early filing 
stage leads to more patent applications. Given the circumstances at such 
an early stage in the development cycle, inventors choose to err on the 
side of filing patent applications for most inventions. This early in 
development, there is uncertainty as to the possible upside of a given 
invention. But failure to file early likely prohibits the inventor from ever 
enjoying this, albeit probabilistic, upside. And the potential upside to 
filing is compared against a small and fixed downside- the costs of filing 
(attorney and filing fees), which most likely pale in comparison with the 
potential value of patent exclusivity. 
After deciding to file early, patent applicants continue to use the 
patent system as the development process continues and new invention 
information comes to light. Applicants file continuation applications to 
claim different aspects of their invention that new information has 
identified as commercially valuable.m Applicants also file new 
applications, or continuations-in-part, as the invention evolves to include 
technical aspects not originally disclosed in the earlier-filed application." 2 
The patent rules, lack of information, and uncertainty prompt inventors 
209. See infra Part III.C.3 for a discussion of another patent value that is independent of 
commercialization-assertion against other companies. 
210. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at HY75-76 ("The future, however, tends to become clearer as we 
move toward it."). 
211. See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
212. See infra Part III.B.2.b. 
November 2009] THE FOLLY OF EARLY FILING 97 
to "file early."''3 The additional information that is generated as time 
continues creates an accompanying "file often" mentality."4 
I. Early Decision Window Prompts Inventors to Err on the Side of 
Filing 
When an inventor reaches conception, the inventor is faced with a 
choice. Either file for a patent with the little technical and market 
information available or wait while more information becomes available 
and the value of a patent right becomes more certain. The patent rules 
make it risky to wait, with each additional day increasing the risk that the 
inventor loses the right to her invention."5 If she loses her patent rights 
because of delaying filing, they are lost forever, and she possibly 
becomes subservient to another's patent rights."6 
Add to these circumstances the fact that an inventor is unlikely to 
know if others are close to inventing the same subject matter upon which 
she is working. Those researching in a given field are sometimes aware of 
similar researchers doing similar things."7 But the specific act of filing a 
patent application is secret."8 An inventor does not know if someone else 
has filed an application until-at the earliest-eighteen months after the 
filing date when the application is published.''9 Such a discovery occurs 
only if the inventor is actively looking."o And a discovery at this stage is, 
in most cases, made too late for the inventor to take corrective action."' 
The silence as to others' patenting activities can extend another year if a 
provisional application was filed and could be until the application issues 
if the earlier applicant elects not to publish."' The lack of knowledge also 
extends to other acts that may bar the inventor's patent rights, such as an 
offer for sale or publication by another that occurs after the date of 
conception but more than one year before an application is filed."3 
The inventor, when making an early filing decision, not only knows 
little about others' filing activities but also knows little about the 
commercial value of the exclusivity a patent would provide. ''4 As 
213. See infra Part ll.B.2. 
214. See infra Part ll.B.2. 
215. Kitch. supra note 12, at 270 ("(T]t is risky not to immediately seek a patent .... "). 
216. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 83, at 541 ("(W]hile being the first to invent creates a right to a 
patent, the statutory bars can destroy the right if the inventor waits too long to file an application."). 
217. See Duffy, supra note 15, at 462-63 (providing the example of multiple people racing to invent 
the telegraph). 
218. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2006). 
219. /d.§ 122(b). 
220. See Mark Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2oo8 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 21-22. 
221. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b}. 
222. /d.§ 122(b}(2). 
223. Kitch, supra note 12, at 270 ("Since the commercial use or publication (that creates a statutory 
bar] may be by others, the bar is not within the inventor's control."). 
224. See id. (noting that at the early filing stage, the "practical significance of the innovation may 
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discussed earlier, little information regarding the invention, particularly 
market information, is required at the early filing stage.225 This lack of 
information makes the projected value of a patent incredibly uncertain. 
At this early stage of development the value falls within a wide range, 
with a defined floor being the cost of obtaining the patent and an almost 
unlimited ceiling of the best expected profits from the exclusive sale of 
the patented technology. 
Faced with a choice to file early or wait, most inventors err on the 
side of filing. This is the commonly accepted professional advice given to 
patent practitioners.226 The reasons behind such advice, and therefore 
why most follow it, are four-fold. 
First, the patent's ability to facilitate commercialization in the future 
becomes more valuable the further out the time of filing is from possible 
commercialization.227 There is value in having the option to exercise 
patent exclusivity in light of this uncertainty. That is, the patent leaves its 
owner the option to exercise exclusivity at any time during its period of 
exclusivity-if the invention's commercial value becomes clearer, the 
patent is there to help make the invention profitable.228 Abramowicz 
explains that "[u]ncertainty ... makes it apparent that patents are 
options, and so long as there is some chance that the option will be worth 
exercising, an inventor may have an incentive to seek a patent."229 
Second, the earlier the patent right's value is examined, the greater 
the range of its value.230 So, early in development, the possible upside is 
larger, which entices more inventors to file. "[A]n inventor will 
sometimes be willing to enter a patent race very early because of the 
possibility that an invention will be more valuable than expected."231 
Professor Dennis Crouch describes a patent "lottery" effect, identifying 
the large upside of the patent right, no matter how unlikely, as the 
incentive to file for patent protection. 232 This lottery effect plays a role in 
be but dimly perceived"); supra Part III.A.3. 
225. See supra Part I.A.r. 
226. See, e.g., JEFFREY G. SHELDON, How TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION§ 1.5 (2009) ("There are 
some reasons for delay in filing. It is unusual that these reasons will overcome the aforementioned 
reasons for filing promptly."). 
227. See NARD, supra note I23, at 30-31. 
228. See Cotropia, supra note 208, at I I37 ("This exclusive use of the invention allows the 
patentholder to commercialize the invention and sell it at a supra-competitive price."). 
229. Abramowicz, supra note I4, at I079· 
230. See William Johnson, Managing Uncertainty in Innovation: The Applicability of Both Real 
Options and Path Dependency Theory, I6 CREATIVITY & INNOVATION MGMT. 274, 276 ("The further 
away an opportunity is in time, the greater the options value on it will be, but the less the resources 
applied to manage it."). 
23 I. Abramowicz, supra note I4, at I079· 
232. See Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common 
Good, I6 GEORGE MAsoN L. REv. I4I, I42 (2oo8). 
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erring on the side of filing-the inventor is focused on the upside, which 
is by definition larger the earlier one files. 233 
Third, the cost of filing- the downside of seeking protection- is low 
compared to the potential value of the patent right. The filing fees are 
small, starting at $330.00.234 The fees even adjust based on the size of the 
inventor.235 The attorney fees are fairly low as well, with the cost for 
preparing the patent application being, on average, $9412.236 The burden 
of these initial costs can be spread out over a year through the use of a 
provisional application, which entails initial fees that are even lower than 
a nonprovisional application.237 With the usual delays in USPTO 
examination, the inventor typically has almost two years to gather more 
information on the invention's worth before outlaying more resources to 
continue her pursuit of a patent application.238 This ability to spread out 
the costs of filing between a provisional application, non-provisional 
application, and the different stages of prosecution lowers the cost of 
filing to an inventor and allows the inventor to defer portions of the costs 
until a time at which the invention's worth is more certain. There is also 
the benefit that this downside is fairly certain and fixed. The inventor 
knows, at the beginning, what the costs of patenting will be. 
Moreover, either by not electing publication or abandoning within 
eighteen months of filing, the inventor does not forgo the option of 
keeping her invention secret, making the costs of filing even lower.239 
There is some risk in revealing technical information by filing and losing 
trade secret protection.240 This risk, however, can be managed by not 
electing early publication and by abandoning a patent application before 
issuance. 241 
233. Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1079· 
234. 37 C.P.R.§ r.16(a)(1) (2oo8). 
235. Small entity filing fee is $165.00. See id. 
236. See AIPLA REPORT, supra note 74, at I-79 (noting the average cost for a relatively complex 
mechanical invention). The cost decreases as the technical complexity decreases. See id. at I-78 
(reporting the average cost for a minimally complex application to be $7012). 
237. The filing fee for a provisional application is $220.00, see 37 C.P.R. § 1.16(d), and the cost of 
preparation is about half that of a utility-$4384. see AIPLA REPORT. supra note 74· 
238. The current average pendency before the first office action is 22.6 months. See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND AccOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 21 (2007), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annuaV2oo6/50304_table4.html. 
239. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006). 
240. See Universal Oil Prods. v. Globe Oil & Refin. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) ("As a reward 
for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly 
to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret."). 
241. Robert M. M. Seto, A Federal Judge's View of the Most Important Change in Patent Law in 
Half-a-Century, II J. TECH. L. & PoL'Y 141, 163 (2006) ("For example, if early prosecution suggests 
that a patent is too hard to obtain from the patent office, the applicant may opt to abandon the patent 
application, and because the application is still secret, he can retain the trade secret and protect it from 
discovery as a trade secret."). 
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There is even a potential upside to disclosing the invention absent 
patent protection. Publication via the USPTO can negate others' 
potential patent rights. 242 Hidden information usually does not qualify as 
prior art and, therefore, cannot be used to invalidate another's patent.243 
Filing solves this problem by facilitating publication that, even if it does 
not result in a patent, makes the invention public and clears the way for 
its inventor by negating other's potential patent rights. 244 An application 
that is published and then abandoned still operates to bar others from 
obtaining exclusivity over the same subject matter.245 
Fourth, there is value in having a patent even if the holder never 
commercializes the claimed technology or attempts to assert the patent. 
Patents can be used as currency when dealing with other companies. 
Patents are typically used as "barter" in licensing discussions, with the 
patent providing an alternative to royalty payments to gain a license to 
some other intellectual property in retum.246 Patents can also provide a 
good defense against others asserting intellectual property. Patenting in 
certain industries is viewed as a means to create and maintain a mutually 
assured destruction arrangement.'47 It is not uncommon for all of the 
players in a given industry to amass patent rights in order to maintain a 
position where if one company asserts its patents against another, there 
will be an equal volley of patents in retum.248 Patents are also sold or 
even donated for tax-write-off purposes.249 
Patents also have value in numbers. Gideon Parchomovsky and 
Polk Wagner recently documented the fact that patenting sometimes 
occurs not because of the individual patent's worth, but because of the 
value of the patent in combination with other patents.250 The mere fact a 
patent is in a given technical area-even if the patent claims a technology 
that is not of much value by itself-helps strengthen other patents held in 
242. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
243. Cf id. § 102(g). 
244. See Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REv. 926, 928 (2000) ("From a 
practical standpoint, the strategy of preemptive publication is made possible by the lag that exists 
between the time a finn obtains sufficient research results to effect a change in the prior art and the 
time it perfects the invention."). 
245. See 35 U.S.C. § ro2(e). 
246. Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEx. L. REv. 
961,990 (2005). 
247. /d. at 990-91; Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 26-27 (describing defensive 
patenting strategy); see Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: 
An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, I979-I995, 32 RAND J. EcoN. 
101, 104, 125 (2001). 
248. Mann, supra note 246, at 990-91. 
249. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffry A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. 1721, 1739 (2oo6). The benefit of such donations has decreased due to legislation. /d. at 1748-49· 
250. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 31-42 (articulating the benefits to either scale- or 
diversity-based patent portfolios). 
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that same technical area and, in turn, strengthens the patent holder's 
position in the related industry.251 
Accordingly, when these costs and benefits are weighed, most 
inventors err on the side of filing early. To be sure, not everyone errs on 
the side of filing early. The less sophisticated inventor may lack the 
knowledge of the patent system to understand it is in her best interests to 
file early, or she may not have quick and easy access to the resources and 
assistance needed to file an application. But most companies who invent 
have the sophistication and the infrastructure in place to exercise the 
option to file early and avoid losing patent exclusivity over the invention. 
For these patent players, the system pushes them to file first and ask 
questions later. 
2. The "File Early, File Often" Mentality 
After an inventor files early, she gains more information about her 
invention. The development process, shown in Figure r above, marches 
on. Further invention information is either generated internally, through 
the ongoing technical definition of the invention or from market 
research, or externally, through changes in complementary technologies, 
technological processes, or market information.252 Patent law allows the 
inventor to use this information to further shape her exclusive rights over 
the invention.253 She can ask for additional patent protection and utilize 
this new information when drafting new patent claims.254 The ability to 
file for additional protection gives an inventor the ability to "file often." 
And inventors do file often by supplementing their initial filings with 
continuations or continuations-in-part, or by filing new applications 
altogether. 255 
a. Continuations 
Under the current patent system, the applicant always has the right 
to "continue" the prosecution of her patent application.256 This means 
that even after a patent examiner has issued a "final rejection" of a 
patent application's claims, the applicant can file a continuation 
251. /d. at 37 ("In an environment where individual patents are increasingly of questionable value, 
it is the patent portfolio that is assuming the role of providing meaningful patent-type protection in the 
modem marketplace."). 
252. See supra Part III.A. 
253. See supra Part III.A. 
254. See supra Part III.A.2. 
255. Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. eta!., Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office-Extended, 12 FED. OR. B.J. 35, 38 (2002) (noting that these follow-up 
applications make up a significant percentage of pending patent applications). 
256. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberley A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 67-69 (2004) (explaining the continuation process). A special form 
of continuation, a request for continued examination, works in a similar way to a continuation. See 35 
U.S.C. § 132(b ). 
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application to try again and get patent protection for the invention.257 The 
filing of a continuation can also occur when the examiner eventually 
allows claims in the original application, potentially amended to respond 
to an initial rejection, or the applicant expressly abandons all of the 
claims in the original application.25 One of the main reasons behind filing 
a continuation application is the ability to include new patent claims that 
capture different aspects of the invention.259 While the new claims must 
be supported by the original application,200 the new claims can recite 
aspects of the invention not originally claimed or vary the level of 
specificity of what is claimed in contrast to the original clairns.26 ' 
When an inventor learns about another technical aspect of an 
invention that is important or becomes aware that a certain variation of 
the invention is commercially advantageous, the inventor can include 
claims to cover this new information in the application. These new claims 
can be included in the original application via an amendment. But, in 
most cases, applicants introduce such new claims in a continuation.262 The 
new information prompts a new filing-the filing of a continuation 
application. 
New information about a competitor's use of the invention also 
prompts the filing of continuations. A common use of a continuation 
application is to draft claims that cover an embodiment of the invention 
being used by a competitor that becomes known after the initial filing. 263 
The ability to continue to define new patent protection encourages 
most inventors to always keep a continuation of an originally filed 
application on file. 264 As long as the applications overlap in their 
pendency, the applicant can include any claims that are originally 
supported.265 The pending applications give an applicant the option of 
getting patent protection at any time and getting protection that is 
257. See 37 C.P.R. § I.II3 (2008) (defining a final rejection); Lemley & Moore, supra note 256, at 
64. 
258. Lemley & Moore, supra note 256, at 67-69. 
259. There are other reasons, such as trying to convince the examiner to allow an already filed set 
of patent claims. /d. at 64. 
260. See 35 U.S.C. § 120; Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 156o (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting 
that newly added claims must be described and enabled by the original specification). 
26r. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. EcoN. PERSPECf!VES, Spring 
2005, at 75, 81-82 ("Two of the most common practices used by patentees to increase their chances of 
winning the patent lottery are continuations and a proliferation of closely related patents."). 
262. See Lemley & Moore, supra note 256, at 64. 
263. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[The 
patentholder] admitted at trial that he did not consider placing the controls outside the console until 
he became aware that some of Gentry's competitors were so locating the recliner controls."). 
264. Lemley & Moore, supra note 256, at 81 ("In some industries, notably biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, firms typically keep a continuation application pending during the entire lifetime of 
the original patent."). 
265. See 35 U.S.C. § 120. 
November 2009) THE FOLLY OF EARLY FILING 103 
tailored to what the applicant or a competitor is doing.'66 That is, there is 
always an application on file where the applicant can apply new 
information she learns either internally or externally. z(ry Thus, applicants 
"file often" by habitually filing continuations. This tendency is a direct 
response to the fact that original filing occurs so early, with so little 
invention information. 
b. Continuations-in-Part and New Applications 
Another option the inventor has is to file a new application when 
new information is produced. This usually takes the form of a 
"continuation-in-part" -where a new filing overlaps with an originally 
filed application but contains a new "invention" in that there are 
additions to the disclosure that were not originally described in enough 
detail to meet the written description and enablement requirements to 
patentability.268 These continuations-in-part do not enjoy the original 
application's filing date for the newly added material because these new 
parts of the disclosure were technically invented after the filing date.269 
The common continuation-in-part situation is an improvement to the 
original invention. 
By filing a continuation-in-part, or a new application, the applicant 
can capture follow-on inventions that she develops after the early filing 
date. The patentability of these improvements is limited by the original 
patent application, which is now potential prior art.270 However, the 
ability to file a continuation in part or new application demonstrates 
another way in which the patent system allows an inventor to 
compensate for information she lacked at the time of filing by filing for 
more patent protection when new information comes to light. Put 
another way, an inventor can also "file often" by filing a continuation in 
part or new application, both of which build off the original application 
and initial invention. 27 ' 
c. EARLY FILING EXACERBATES THE PATENT SYSTEM'S PROBLEMS 
Early filing and the overfiling it causes contribute to the recently 
identified ills of the patent system. By forcing inventors to err on the side 
of filing early and then following up with filing often, the early-filing 
system overloads the examination process and increases the ever-
266. See id. 
267. See id. 
268. In re Klein, 5 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259 (Comm'r Pat. 1930). 
269. See, e.g., PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 131o-II (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(limiting the continuation-in-part's claims that are not supported by the earlier disclosure to the 
continuation-in-pan's filing date). 
270. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
271. These are all typically considered to be of the same "family" of patents. 
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expanding population of issued patents. The problems created continue 
because the earlier the patent is filed in the development cycle, the 
greater the likelihood that the issued patents are never developed.272 
These circumstances incentivize patent holders to become "patent trolls" 
because it is cheaper to enforce an early-filed patent than it is to 
commercialize it.273 Early filing also increases the likelihood that the 
boundaries the patent defines are unclear due to the lack of invention-
specific information available in such early filed patents.274 While these 
are all problems in their own right, they also directly undermine the 
previously articulated benefits to early filing. 
I. Early Filing Encourages Additional Applications and Additional 
Patents 
The early-filing doctrine results in more applications being filed. As 
described above, at the early filing stage, most inventors err on the side 
of filing patent applicationS.275 Inventions that have some commercial 
potential, regardless of how remote, are claimed in patent applications.276 
This includes inventions that, if filing decisions were made later in the 
development process, would not be converted into patent applications 
because, at this later time, they clearly lack value. And the earlier filing 
occurs, the more product configurations are in the mix upon which 
patent applications cail be filed. As shown in Figure 1, there are just 
more potential products to patent early in the development process.277 
All of these factors combine to create more patent applications than if 
patenting was decided later in the development process. 
In addition to these initial filings are the numerous follow-on 
filings. 278 As new information about an invention surfaces, an inventor 
files more applications. These additional applications take the form of 
continuations, continuations-in-part, or new applications. The early-filing 
doctrine not only adds additional original applications on the front end-
where applications are filed to play it safe-but the doctrine also causes 
more applications to be filed during the prosecution of the original 
application to make up for the lack of information on the front-end. 
The problem with these additional applications is that they 
contribute to an overloaded patent examination system. One of the 
major causes of the issuance of "bad patents" -patents covering 
inventions that are actually unpatentable-is the USPTO's inability to 
272. See supra Part III.B. 1. 
273. See supra Part III. B. 1. 
274. See supra Part LA. I. 
275. See supra Part III.B. 1. 
276. See supra Part III.B. 1. 
277. See supra Part III.A. 
278. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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thoroughly examine each application.279 The number of patent 
applications is rising exponentially each year while, at the same time, the 
USPTO faces a significant examiner attrition rate. 28o Examiners are thus 
given very little time to perform a complete examination and determine 
whether the claimed invention is patentable.28 ' The addition of more 
patent applications because of the early-filing doctrine adds to the 
overload problem, causing examiners to spend even less time on each 
application and, as a result, do a worse job of weeding out applications 
for unpatentable inventions. 
More applications also means more patents issued. Early filing has 
the same multiplier effect on issued patents as it does on filed ones. Not 
only are marginally-valuable patents filed and then issued, early filing on 
even valuable patents prompts "make-up" filing later in the process, with 
continuations and new applicationS.282 These follow-on filings add even 
more issued patents to the mix. Where there may have been only one 
patent issued for a given product, applicants seek-and get-multiple 
patents to compensate for the lack of information early in the 
development process.283 
The high volume of issued patents creates problems of its own. The 
more patents there are, the more likely there will be patent thickets-
areas of technology encumbered by numerous patents on various aspects 
of the technology.284 The number of thicket situations increases when 
patents are issued from continuations or continuations in part since these 
types of filings, by definition, cover the same general invention but with a 
279. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 6o 
STAN. L. REv. 45, 46-47 (2007) (identifying the resource problem faced by the USPTO to effectively 
review the growing number of applications); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the 
Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 304, 314 ("[T)he average time 
allocated for an examiner to address one application is understood to be between sixteen and 
seventeen hours. Given the complexities involved in parsing an application, conducting a prior art 
search and drafting an Office Action, this period is surprisingly short."). 
280. See Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent 
Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 132 (2006) ("[T)he USPTO still cannot hire quickly enough to 
keep pace with both the demands of the job and the attrition rate."). 
281. Thomas, supra note 279 (noting that examiners are allotted sixteen to seventeen hours per 
application). 
282. See supra Part III.B.2. 
283. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 31-42 (discussing the prevalence of 
"scale" portfolios). 
284. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, in I INNOVATION POLICY AND THE EcoNOMY II9, I2I (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) ("(O)ur 
patent system, while surely a spur to innovation overall, is in danger of imposing an unnecessary drag 
on innovation by enabling multiple rights owners to 'tax' new products, processes, and even business 
methods."); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SciENCE 698, 698-99 (1998) (arguing that an increase in 
private intellectual property rights in biomedical research may reduce the total amount of such 
research}. 
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varying set of claims.'85 Sheer numbers of patents also make it tough for 
competitors to digest even unrelated patents.'86 High numbers also allow 
patent holders to easily overwhelm competitors or potential licensees, 
making it difficult for such targets to properly evaluate the patents' worth 
or defend against them in litigation.'87 
Since these patents are issued from an overburdened USPTO, some 
of the patents will be invalid ones. Issuance of these bad patents, in 
addition to creating the problems mentioned above, comes with its own 
set of harms. A bad patent, for example, may give its holder exclusive 
control over a minor technological advance, creating roadblocks to 
innovation that are typically not permitted under patent law.'88 Since 
even poor-quality patents enjoy a presumption of validity, the patentee 
can threaten to stop others from practicing what they rightfully can do or 
she can seek licensing fees for activities that are actually allowable.'89 The 
bad patents create in terrorem effects, deterring socially acceptable and 
beneficial behavior."J!' Those who want to use the patented technology 
must expend significant resources to determine whether the patent is 
invalid and, if forced, spend money to legally establish this fact. 
A final problem with early filing increasing the number of 
applications and overburdening the patent application process is that this 
situation delays the expiration of filed patents. More applications not 
only causes poor examination, it also leads to a delay in examination. 
The explosion of applications is identified by many as causing the ever-
increasing delay in USPTO action on pending applications.'9' While the 
patent term is measured from the time of filing,'9' delays in prosecution 
caused by the USPTO do not reduce the patent term. The patent system 
"credits" the patentee for such delays, increasing the patent term in 
proportion to the delays caused by the USPT0.'93 This means that delays 
caused by an increase in applications because of the early filing doctrine 
285. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 261, at 81-82. 
286. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 35-36. 
287. !d. 
288. See MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 83, at 647; Cotropia, supra note 86, at 1525 ("Exclusive 
control over these minor developments would act as roadblocks, creating disincentives to future 
inventors. Many patents on small technical advances make it extremely difficult and 'expensive to 
search and to license' these patents in order to produce further innovations."). 
289. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 279, at 47 (noting that the presumption of validity makes 
"defendants face an uphill battle persuading the courts to overrule that errant determination."). 
290. See John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent 
Administrative Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 727,731 (2002) (detailing these detrimental effects). 
291. See Jason J. Chung, Note, Patent Pendency Problems and Possible Solutions to Reducing 
Patent Pendency at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 
58, 63 (zooS). 
292. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (zoo6). 
293. See id. § 154(b) (establishing the adjustment of the patent term due to USPTO delays). 
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extend the time period between patent filing and patent expiration.294 A 
delayed patent expires later, beyond the traditional twenty years from 
the filing date.295 
This de facto increase in patent term due to early filing negates the 
socially-beneficial gains of early filing identified by Duffy. Duffy views 
early expiration as a benefit to early filing.296 Because of the overload 
early filing puts on the USPTO, early filing does not necessarily lead to 
early expiration. It is true that the early filing doctrine leads to the patent 
getting filed earlier, and the expiration clock starting to tick earlier. But 
the delays early filing creates at the USPTO lengthen the patent term, 
causing expiration and public dedication to happen later. If the delays 
become long enough, the credited time may be sufficient to, on net, lead 
to later expiration of the earlier-filed patent than if the patent was filed 
later. This problem-contributed to by overfiling-counteracts any gains 
in earlier patent expiration allegedly created by the early-filing doctrine. 
2. Early Filing Leads to Underdevelopment of Patented 
Technologies 
More patents filed, examined, and issued is not necessarily a bad 
thing. Patent theory presumes that a socially-beneficial product or 
technology accompanies each issued patent-'97 This is the exchange 
society obtains-a new and non-obvious technology in return for the 
grant of a limited period of exclusivity.29ll If the early-filing doctrine leads 
to more of a good thing-that is, more technological progress-then the 
extra applications are not a concern. The problem is that the earlier a 
patent is filed in the development cycle, the less likely the covered 
invention is ever commercialized. 
294. See Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-0, Extending the Patent Term: Most Patents Are 
Extended Due to PTO Delay, http://www.patentlyo.corn!patent/2oo8/o3/extending-the-p.html (Mar. 
14, 2008, 13:00 CDT) (establishing that most patent terms are extended due to USPTO delays). 
295. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). 
296. See supra Part II. C. 
297. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.") (quoting U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 8)). 
There are other theories as to the ultimate value of patents. Patents facilitate the disclosure of 
inventions, and the disclosures add to the public knowledge. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the 
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1028 (1989) 
("The incentive to disclose argument, which has been more popular with the courts than with 
commentators, rests on the premise that in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep 
their inventions secret in order to prevent competitors from exploiting them. Secrecy prevents the 
public from gaining the full benefit of new knowledge and leads to wasteful duplicative research."). 
298. See NARD, supra note 123, at 3o--31 (noting patent law's role "in inducing the transformation 
of inventions into downstream, commercialized products"). 
I08 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:65 
First, the earlier an application is filed, the more likely the 
application is filed on an invention that is never commercialized. As 
previously mentioned, and graphically depicted in Figure r, many early 
technological ideas turn out to be technically unfeasible or commercially 
worthless and therefore are never commercialized.299 Inventors still file 
applications on these early ideas because, at the early stages, they all 
have commercial potential. As time goes by, and development continues, 
the inventor figures out which inventions-and thus which patents-are 
still commercially viable and which are not. And the earlier the filing, the 
more inventions that are inevitably not commercialized make their way 
into the USPTO, are examined, and become the subject of issued 
patents.300 
Viewing patents as options-specifically options to commercialize-
further drives this point home. Patent rights can be analogized to real 
options, and particularly to a call option. Thus the patent provides the 
ability to decide at a future date to exercise the patent exclusivity option 
to gain the exclusive right to commercialize the claimed invention.301 
Patents have an exercise price3"2 -the cost of commercialization-and a 
purchase price-the cost of filing of a patent application and the 
accompanying development needed to qualify for patent protection.303 A 
patent can therefore be depicted graphically as a call option, as shown 
below in Figure 2. 
299. See supra Part liLA. 
300. See supra Part III.B.I. 
301. Cotropia, supra note 208, at 1134 ("Many have made the general analogy-describing in 
broad terms how operationally a patent, particularly the accompanying right to exclude and the 
predefined patent term, behaves like a real option."); see Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1073 n.23 
(citing Martin & Pamoy, supra note 2o8). 
302. The exercise price is "the amount of money invested to exercise the option if you are 'buying' 
the asset (with a call option)." ToM CoPELAND & VLADIMIR ANTIKARov, REAL OPTioNs: A 
PRACfiTIONER'S GUIDE 6 (2003). 
303. See Co tropia, supra note 208, at 1 135-39 (describing in detail the components of the exercise 
and purchase price of a patent option). 
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FIGURE 2: PATENT AS CALL OPTION 
Value of Patent Right (Right to Exclude) 
The initial value of the option is negative given that there is a 
purchase price for a patent-a combination of the cost of filing and the 
development expenditures needed to meet the patent requirements.304 
Once filed, the potential value cannot go lower than the purchase price?05 
The option's upper value is defined by the value of having exclusive 
rights to commercialize the patented invention.300 This value is not 
realized until the option-the patent-is exercised by using the patent's 
exclusivity to assist in the commercialization of the underlying 
invention?''7 
Since the patent system requires only conception and the drafting of 
a patent application, the purchase of a patent option is relatively 
inexpensive.3o8 In contrast, the potential value of the option at this early 
stage is quite high due to the lack of information about the invention and 
the accompanying uncertainty. As mentioned above, this is the 
combination that makes the filing of an application-the purchase of the 
patent option- too good a deal to pass up.309 And since there are so many 
304. See id. at II35-37· 
305. See id. 
306. Id. at II37-38. As time passes, the value becomes more identifiable. See Abramowicz, supra 
note 14, at 1091. 
307· See Cotropia, supra note 208, at II37-38 (identifying this commercial way to exercise a patent 
option); Dam, supra note 124, at 247 (noting that patent exclusivity allows the patentee to 
commercialize at a price to recoup research and development costs). 
308. See Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1091 ("When patenting is relatively inexpensive, it may be 
worthwhile to obtain a patent even when the chances that the patent will be practical to develop are 
very low."); Cotropia, supra note 2o8, at r 135-37 (describing the low option price of a patent right). 
309· See supra Part Ill.B.I. 
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potential ideas available at the early filing stage, there are more 
options-more patentable inventions-purchased. As time passes, the 
true value of the option-the value of commercialization-becomes 
clearer and some options will turn out not to be worth exercising. An 
unexercised patent option is a patented invention that is not 
commercialized.3' 0 Therefore, looking at patents as options provides 
another description as to why early filing leads to more 
underdevelopment of patented inventions. Essentially, early filing leads 
to more bets-option purchases by way of patent filings-that go bad 
and have no payout because they cover inventions not worth 
commercializing. Thus, inventors may fold- they choose not to 
commercialize. 
There is another reason why early filing leads to underdevelopment 
of patented inventions. Early filing creates a situation where few 
resources are required to file a patent application and, in contrast, much 
more resources are required to commercialize the patented invention. 
The patent system does not require much development prior to filing and 
so, after filing, the inventor has a long way to go to commercialization.3" 
As Figure I demonstrates, there are usually many stages to new product 
development, where both technical and market information is generated 
in order to identify the product configuration truly worthy of 
commercialization.3' 2 Since patenting happens at an early development 
stage, there is a long way to go until commercial launch of the patented 
invention. 
This situation can be recharacterized under the patents as real 
options theory. The lower the purchase price of the patent option-that 
is, the less development needed to file a valid application- the higher the 
exercise price- the cost of commercialization.3' 3 Since there is little 
invested in the front end (i.e., the option's price was low), exercising the 
option is a bigger step than it would be if the option was purchased later 
in the development cycle and there were already more sunk development 
costs. Figure 3, below, represents this relationship graphically. The less 
development needed to file for a patent, the more the exercise cost will 
be. 
310. See infra Part III.C.3. 
31 r. See supra Part I.A.r. 
312. See supra Part III.A.r. 
313. See Abramowicz, supra note 14, at 1o83 ("Imposing minimal requirements for obtaining a 
patent will decrease both the price of the patent option and the chance that the option will never be 
exercised."). 
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FIGURE 3: TIME OF FILING AND EXERCISE PRICE 
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The problem with these circumstances is that they lead to even less 
commercialization of patented inventions. Since the early filing system 
requires little buy-in on the front end, patent holders are not as invested 
in the claimed technologies, and so they are less interested in 
commercializing.3 ' 4 At the very least, they will wait longer from the time 
of filing before they develop the technology, as compared to if they had 
paid more for the option initially.3' 5 Commercialization appears as a high 
hurdle compared to the initial investment to get the patent. Abramowicz 
comes to a similar conclusion, working through proofs to establish that, 
when taking uncertainty into account, the earlier in the development 
process a patent is obtained, the more likely the invention is never 
developed.3 ' 6 
A third reason early filing increases the likelihood of 
underdevelopment is the management perspective problem early filing 
creates. The further away the ultimate benefit (i.e., commercialization) is 
from an initial purchase (i.e., the filing of the patent), "the less the 
resources applied to manage it."3'; That is, management is more likely to 
ignore, and in turn devote less energy to pursuing, long-term interests.3 ' 8 
314. /d. 
315. /d. 
316. /d. at 1090. 
317. Johnson, supra note 230, at 276. 
318. Abramowicz makes an additional argument that supports the conclusion that early filing leads 
to underdevelopment. He argues that the earlier the filing, the more likely a patent holder will wait 
longer to commercialize and, in the end, possibly never commercialize. See Abramowicz, supra note 
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The patented invention, or at least patent protection, is more likely to be 
forgotten the further patenting is from the end goal of 
commercialization. 
This underdevelopment of patented invention, for the reasons 
articulated, can have serious consequences because it can only hamper, 
as opposed to promote, technological progress. These patents, by 
definition, cover technologies that are commercially worthless in the eyes 
of their owners and do not generate a social benefit on their own. But 
they still drag down the development of other technologies. They 
contribute to the patent thicket situation already discussed, creating 
roadblocks to innovation.3' 9 A competitor does not know, without some 
investigation, that the patent does not specifically exclude the technology 
he is pursuing.320 Accordingly, these early-filed and undeveloped patents 
do little more than generate costs to other developers.32 ' 
Uncommercialized patents also fuel the use of patents as a litigation 
tool. As observed by Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, it is much 
cheaper to exercise the patent option by litigating as opposed to 
commercializing because litigation is cheaper to initiate and has less of a 
downside than commercial development.322 Such litigation is discussed in 
more detail below-usually viewed as patent-troll litigation where a 
noncommercializer seeks rents from others.323 Using a patent to simply 
generate rents as opposed to commercialize is viewed as socially negative 
behavior.324 The early-filing doctrine facilitates this situation by creating a 
host of patents that are unlikely to be, and too costly to be, 
commercialized. 
Finally, the overfiling of these patents, also caused by the early-
filing doctrine, simply magnifies the number of undeveloped patents. 
While continuations and new applications are filed later, and are 
therefore more likely to be commercialized, some still necessarily go 
I4, at I09Q-9I. Abramowicz observes that, while each year without commercializing loses the patentee 
potential profit, the additional year also begets more information and more certainty as to the 
potential commercial worth of the invention. /d. Abramowicz notes that choosing to wait can continue 
until the patent expires, and in tum the option to develop expires. /d. While this may be the case, it 
seems unlikely that since patents give the holder the option to delay commercialization, the patent 
holder will delay past the inherent optinmm time to commercialize. That is, when the invention 
becomes beneficial to commercialize, the patent holder will commercialize even if they could wait 
longer. See id. 
3I9. See supra Part III.C.I. 
320. See supra Part III.C. 1. 
32 I. See supra Part Ill. C. 1. 
322. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 2o8; see also Cotropia, supra note 208, at I I38-39, I I47 
(furthering this discussion). 
323. See infra Part III.C.3. 
324. See infra Part III.C.3. 
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undeveloped. These additional patents generate even more waste and 
negative impact on society. 
The patent system attempts to counteract underdevelopment by 
reducing remedies available for patents that are not commercialized by 
their owners.3' 5 This is unlikely to deter the increase in initial, early filings 
that leads to undeveloped patents. When filing, the inventor is unsure 
about commercialization and thus values the patent as including the 
possibility of commercialization and the accompanying full enforcement 
to protect that commercialization. This valuation may be discounted 
slightly by a possible reduction in remedies, but such a change on the 
very back end is unlikely to influence the front-end analysis. Such lack of 
devaluation is particularly true when considered in light of all of the 
uncertainty surrounding the decision to file early in the development 
process. 
This result from early filing-underdevelopment of the patented 
technology-directly negates one of the benefits of early filing 
articulated by Kitch. Kitch viewed early filing as one of the ways patents 
acted as prospects and, in turn, promoted commercialization.32 For a 
good number of patents, early filing is more likely to have the opposite 
effect. Patents go uncommercialized because they were filed on 
inventions that are not worthy of commercialization. Patent holders are 
less likely to commercialize because commercialization is comparatively 
more costly. And given the distance between early filing and 
commercialization, patent holders are less likely to pay close enough 
attention to commercial prospects. In contrast, early filed patents are 
more likely to be used in litigation as opposed to development. All of 
these insights comment on the actions of the patent holder-the 
technology manager under Kitch's analysis327 -and how she acts in the 
face of uncertainty and little initial investment in, or information on, the 
invention's commercialization and commercial value. 
3· Early Filing Fosters Patent Trolls 
The early filing doctrine, by prompting overfiling and 
underdevelopment, fosters patent trolls. Individuals who seek to develop 
a given technological solution are pushed to file early-shortly after 
conception-and then most likely do not devote the resources to 
commercialize the patented technology for the reasons articulated 
above.3' 8 These unused patents can create problems. Instead of letting the 
patent sit dormant, the inventor, or someone who purchases the patent, 
325. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 389-90 (2006). 
326. Kitch, supra note 12, at 266. 
327. /d. at 276. 
328. See supra Part III.C.2. 
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is likely to take the lower-cost avenue of asserting the patent in litigation 
to extract rents from those who have commercialized in the patented 
area. Put another way, the patent system's early-filing doctrine causes 
inventors to file and, when the patent issues, the patent is more likely to 
be asserted for litigation purposes as opposed to commercialized.329 
Those who use the patent to simply extract rents, as opposed to clear 
commercialization space, are labeled "patent trolls.'mo 
Early filing produces more applications and, in tum, more patents. 
These additional patents, particularly those filed early in the 
development cycle, are rarely developed fully. This lack of development 
is sometimes due to the high cost of commercialization compared to the 
low initial investment in patenting.331 Martin and Partnoy recognized that 
there is a cheaper exercise price for the patent option-asserting the 
patent right against someone else.332 They note that litigating is cheaper 
than commercialization.333 There is less risk as well, given that the only 
downside to litigating is attorney fees and losing the patent as compared 
to being burdened with sunk costs and fixed resources tailored to a 
possibly unprofitable commercial product or process.334 This comparative 
cost advantage to litigating prompts more patent holders to exercise their 
patent options by asserting the patent in litigation as opposed to 
commercializing. This comparison is depicted below in Figure 4, with 
assertion having a lower exercise price than commercialization.335 
329. Cotropia, supra note 208, at I I38--39, I I47; Martin & Partnoy, supra note 208. 
330. Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER (S.F.), July 30, 200I, at I (describing the 
term as defined by its creator, Peter Detkin, then assistant general counsel for Intel Corporation). 
33 r. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 208; see also Co tropia, supra note 208, at rr38--39, II47 
(identifying assertion as an alternative way to exercise a patent option). 
332. Supra note 33 r. 
333· Martin & Partnoy, supra note 208; see Cotropia, supra note 2o8, at I I38--39 (noting that the 
difference may be even greater, given that commercialization may involve the additional cost of 
assertion because "some level of assertion of the patent right may be required to keep the market 
clear for the patentee's product"). 
334· See Cotropia, supra note 208, at I I38--39. 
335· The value of the option may be less when it is exercised through assertion as opposed to 
commercialization, but not in all cases. 
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FIGURE 4: ASSERTION VERSUS COMMERCIALIZATION 
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This type of activity, fostered by the early filing doctrine, is the 
behavior that defines the patent troll. The term "patent troll" includes 
"somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are 
not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases 
never practiced. "336 A "patent troll" is a patent holder that does not 
produce anything related to the patent she holds.337 The troll is not using 
the patent to protect her own manufacturing efforts.338 Trolls also rarely 
perform much research and development themselves.339 They basically do 
not participate in the marketplace.340 Instead, patent trolls use their 
patents to obtain value by licensing the patent to those who have already 
begun production of the manufactured technology.341 The patent is 
simply a revenue stream generator. This definition lines up with what 
most early filers, or the purchasers of early filed patents, are likely to do 
with their patents-assert the patent instead of commercialize it. 
Patent trolls are generally frowned upon because they act as only 
"tollkeeper[ s ]" on the road of innovation.342 They tax innovation by 
336. Sandburg, supra note 330. 
337· See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. 
MercExchange, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 997 (2006). 
338. Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, IO INTELL. PROP. L. BuLL. I, 
5 (zoos). 
339· Merges, supra note 337· 
340. Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 
23 SANTA CLARA CoMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2006). 
341. Chan & Fawcett, supra note 338, at 5· 
342. Merges & Nelson, supra note ns, at 907 (using the term "tollkeeper" to identify a patentee 
that does not assist the real-world development of the invention but simply takes license revenue for 
that development). 
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extracting licensing revenue without giving anything back in return.343 
Because patent trolls have no intention of developing or assisting in the 
development of the technology covered by the patents they hold, they 
provide no benefit to society. Instead, "[b ]y acquiring [patent] claims and 
threatening or pursuing litigation, the patent trolls seek and often receive 
economic settlements from genuine innovators and producers that 
greatly exceed the true economic value of the patents in question."344 
This goal is characterized as "harmful rent-seeking."345 
The fostering of patent trolls further rebuts the alleged 
commercialization advantages of the early filing doctrine. Not only does 
early filing fail to result in commercialization of the patented invention, it 
also promotes the anticommercial use of patents as litigation instruments 
and nothing more. 
4· Early Filing Contributes to Unclear Patent Boundaries 
The early-filing doctrine also leads to unclear patent boundaries. 
The scope of patent protection is defined by patent claims. The 
interpretation of these claims is a major part of any patent evaluation or 
enforcement.346 As I have argued before, determining the exact contours 
of these boundaries presents an information cost problem.347 That is, even 
if the specific interpretation methodology being used is clearly defined, 
determining claim meaning still involves obtaining, understanding, and 
using invention-specific information. 348 
At the early-filing stage, there is a minimal amount of technical and 
market information about the invention. This dearth of information 
impacts the patent application. The components that traditionally aid in 
the definition of the patent claims-particularly the specification and 
embodiments and drawings contained therein-are not robust because of 
this lack of invention-specific information. This lack of information 
affects the claim interpretation process-making it difficult for the 
USPTO, courts, and other patent players to determine the definitive 
scope of patent protection.349 
The need to file early also prompts the inventor to intentionally 
draft the patent application, including the patent specification and 
343· See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 1015 (2006) (No. 05-130). 
344· /d. at 6-7. 
345· Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REv. 509, 509 (2003). 
346. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim 
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 65-69 (2005). 
347· See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REv. 57, 59-6o (2005). 
348. /d. at C)0--91. 
349· /d. at 77-81. 
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claims, in vague and general terms. The specification needs to be 
intentionally general so that it can support later-filed continuations.350 
These continuations, filed to capture later-developed information, do not 
enjoy the filing date of the original application unless the earlier 
specification supports the new claims.35' The inventor needs to draft the 
original specification in such a way so that she can argue that the newly 
filed claims were invented at the original specification's filing date. The 
more general and vague the original disclosure is, the more likely support 
is found. By drafting in vague and general terms, the applicant is 
leveraging off of the skill in the art and reasonable experimentation to fill 
the gaps of the nonspecific disclosure. This gives her flexibility when later 
articulating the invention that was earlier disclosed.352 Early filing 
prompts this type of vague specification because the applicant knows that 
she will have to fill holes with continuations later and she needs support 
for these continuations in the original application. 
Early filing encourages general and vague patent claims in another 
manner as well. When drafting patent claims early in the technological 
development process, the applicant does not know the specific "shelf 
space" she will need.353 She does not know what claim protection is most 
valuable. Broad claims allow her to hedge her bet-it is more likely that 
the most valuable commercial form of the invention falls into a broad 
claim as opposed to a more specific claim.354 This need for vague claims 
also aids an applicant in the most likely use for an early filed patent-
assertion in litigation. Broadly worded, unclear claims help in 
negotiations because they both appear to capture more subject matter 
and make it more difficult for the opposing party to value the litigation 
claims or the patent itself.355 Patent trolls are often said to intentionally 
seek "to acquire broad and nebulous patent claims that arguably 
350. See supra Part III.B.2. 
351. 35 u.s.c. § 120 (2000). 
352. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that 
drawings from a design patent can support, and give an earlier filing date to, a later filed utility 
patent). 
353· Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEx. L. 
REv. 1627, 16'72 (2007) ("Patents are surely playing a role in the age-old battle over 'shelf space' in this 
competitive industry."). 
354· See Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 151, 171-73 (2005) ("[T]he broader the patent scope. the more protection 
the patent holder receives and the more competing products she can exclude."). 
355· See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of 
Innovation, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 18<J9, 1829-30 (2007) ("As noted earlier, a vague patent makes it 
harder for defendants to determine the scope of its protection and hence unwilling to take the risk of 
going to trial."). 
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encompass existing technologies relied on by companies with deep 
pockets. "356 
A vague and general patent specification and claim leads to unclear 
patent boundaries. These are the two primary means of determining the 
scope of exclusivity given by the patent. The claims are the primary tool 
used to define exclusivity and the specification is meant to inform the 
claims' meaning.357 If both of these lack information about the invention 
and are intentionally drafted in general and vague terms, the process of 
defining the claims is difficult.358 There is also uncertainty as to the 
claims' ultimate, correct meaning, with poor inputs into the claim 
interpretation process-vague and general claims and specification-
resulting in erratic results.359 
Unclear boundaries create many of the problems of the patent 
system. Jim Bessen and Michael Meurer point to unclear boundaries as 
the root cause of the current patent crisis.300 Unclear boundaries increase 
transaction costs surrounding patents-making licensing and settlement 
more difficult.361 Companies face more uncertainty as to which patents 
block their innovations.362 Patent holders have less understanding of who 
they may assert their patents against and what shelf space a patent 
provides.363 Courts and the USPTO must expend more judicial resources 
resolving the ambiguities created by unclear boundaries; and, in turn, 
appeals and reversals are more prevalent.364 Unclear boundaries also 
facilitate patent trolls and the ability to hold up innovators by asserting 
ambiguous patents.365 Unclear boundaries therefore magnify some of the 
356. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc., supra note 343, at 6. 
357. Co tropia, supra note 346, at 79--82. 
358. !d. at 9Q-9I. 
359· /d. 
360. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at 8-rr (concluding that the fuzzy and unpredictable 
boundaries of patents prevent them from "work[ing] well as property"). 
361. Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 Hous. L. 
REv. rr65, r I7D-7I (2oo8) ("The primary function of patent law is ill-served if the property right 
embodied in the patent has poorly defined boundaries and therefore does a poor job of reducing 
transaction costs."). 
362. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at ro ("There is thus no reliable way of determining patent 
boundaries short of litigation."). 
363. /d. at 34-35 (noting how clearly-delineated property rights encourage investment into the 
protected property). 
364. See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction 
Trends, r6 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, rogli--97 (2oor) (finding a growing trend of reversals of claim 
interpretation holdings). 
365. See David A. Fitzgerald II, Note, Saving Alternative Dispute Resolution in Patent Law: 
Countering the Effects of the Patent Troll Revolution, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DrsP. REsoL. 345, 36o n.76 
("One of the ways patent trolls abuse the patent system is by filing continuing applications on their 
vague patents in order to extend the patent term long enough to have a big corporation infringe the 
patent."). 
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earlier articulated harms of the early-filing doctrine- underdevelopment 
of early-filed patents and patent trolls. Essentially, ambiguous 
boundaries strike at the heart of the efficient workings of the patent 
system.366 
IV. A SoLUTION-OPTIMIZING FILING TIME BY REQUIRING AN AcTUAL 
REDUCTION TO PRACTICE BEFORE ISSUANCE 
The question is how to minimize the costs of the early filing system 
while still maintaining some of its benefits. Recent proposals addressing 
such problems as underdevelopment of patented inventions focus on the 
end of the patent's life, not it's beginning. Abramowicz, for example, 
proposes extending patent terms via auctions to minimize risk of 
underdevelopment.367 Those who do focus on the time of filing suggest an 
even earlier filing date. Duffy recommends that patents be granted at a 
very early stage of the development process.368 And when commentators 
discuss moving patenting to a later point in the development process, 
they dismiss it. Abramowicz mentions the "policy lever" of "requirin~ 
more achievement up front" to reduce the problems with early filing.3 
But he quickly rejects this solution as "crude."370 He argues that to 
require more before filing "increases inefficient duplication" and 
"exercises the policy lever at the beginning of the patent term when the 
risk of underdevelopment is least clear."371 
This Article explores the road less traveled-a possible front-end 
solution to the problems created by the early filing doctrine.372 Filing 
366. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at 8-13. 
367. Abramowicz, supra note I4, at I ro6--IO. 
368. Duffy, supra note I5, at 47I-72; see Abramowicz, supra note I4, at ro82 (noting that Duffy 
considers moving filing later "but ends up offering the opposite recommendation: that patents should 
be granted at a very early stage when they are mere patent prospects"). Duffy explains that filing is 
moved earlier "based on the need to avoid duplication, not on a quixotic hope of limiting rivalry to 
preserve rents." Duffy, supra note I5, at 498-99. 
369. Abramowicz, supra note I4, at I 107. 
370. /d. 
37!. /d. 
372. Ted Sichelman is a notable exception, recently proposing a two-tier patent system, with initial 
patents and then a commercialization patent. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. 
REv. (forthcoming 2010) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). Sichelman's solution goes much 
further than the one proposed here, creating a whole new patent right and various doctrinal changes to 
handle this new right (as well as the rights granted under our current system. /d. In contrast, my 
solution is much more targeted and, as will be explained, requires few changes to the current patent 
system. 
Another potential front-end solution is limiting continuation practice, as proposed in recent 
rules from the USPTO. See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent 
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent 
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,7I6--843 (Aug. 2I, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. I). Notably, 
these changes, if they ever go into effect, see Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d I345, I364-{i5 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
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early is what causes the problems articulated in Part III, so moving filing, 
or at least examination, to a later time is the most direct response. The 
question is how to change the timing without destroying the incentive to 
invent and exacerbating the problems early filing is meant to solve. 
There is also a need to change filing time in a meaningful, relevant way-
something more than a simple time delay or indiscriminate increase of 
the filing fee. 373 Particularly, a change in the patent requirements is 
needed that directly addresses the problems created by early filing. 
Patent rules need to increase the amount of invention information and 
certainty as to invention value available to an inventor prior to patenting. 
Doing away with constructive reduction to practice and, in turn, 
requiring all applicants to actually reduce their invention to practice-
that is, actually implement the invention and observe that it works for its 
intended purpose-before receiving a patent is the specific front-end 
response explored below. While not a perfect solution, such a 
requirement generates more technical information about the invention 
prior to patent issuance, moves the inventor further down the 
development path before examination, and gives the inventor a clearer 
picture of the possible commercial value of the invention prior to 
patenting. An actual reduction to practice requirement does not, 
however, go too far because of the doctrine's flexibility, its tailoring to 
the technology being invented, and the fact the doctrine stops well short 
of requiring full commercialization. 
A. SPECIFICS OF THE SOLUTION: REQUIRING AN ACTUAL REDUCTION TO 
PRACTICE 
An actual reduction to practice occurs when the inventor builds the 
product or performs the process for which she wishes to file an 
application and then appreciates that the real-world implementation of 
the invention achieves the intended results.374 Currently an actual 
reduction to practice is not required to "invent" under patent law.375 A 
constructive reduction to practice-the filing of a valid patent 
application- acts as a substitute.376 
The proposed solution to the costs of the early-filing doctrine is to 
require an actual reduction to practice before the patent application is 
only address the "file often" problem, not the "file early" problem. 
373· These could be potential solutions, but their bluntness has the potential to do more damage 
than good because they are not, as with an actual reduction to practice requirement, tuned to the 
problems of early filing or to the actual invention at issue. 
374· 3A DONALDS. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS§ IO.o6 (2005). 
375· See supra Part I.A. I. 
376. Frazer v. Schlegel, 498 F. 3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The filing of a patent application is a 
constructive reduction to practice of the invention disclosed therein."). 
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examined. Such a solution would work as follows: No longer would an 
inventor be able to complete the process of invention by simply filing a 
patent application. Instead, the invention would need to have actually 
been reduced to practice to be examined by the USPTO. This means that 
for an invention to be eligible for patentability, it would need to be 
actually implemented. 
While an inventor could initially file her application before actually 
reducing to practice, she would need to implement her invention in the 
real-world and make sure the invention produces the intended result 
prior to being awarded a patent. After this occurred, she would append a 
textual, and most likely graphical, description of this actual reduction to 
practice to her patent application, proving to the USPTO that she has 
met the requirement. There would be no need for the applicant to show 
the examiner the invention in actual operation. Because of the 
inequitable conduct requirement, the examiner could simply take the 
applicant at her word that she actually performed the steps and observed 
the results described in her patent application.377 If the applicant is not 
truthful in her recitation of the actual reduction to practice, the patent 
would be rendered unenforceable by the inequitable conduct doctrine.378 
None of the other requirements for patentability would change. The 
patentability requirements-such as the tests for novelty, the statutory 
bar, and non-obviousness-would stay the same. The filing date would 
still operate as the presumptive date of invention to the extent the 
disclosed invention was reduced to practice.379 
The only difference would be the deferred examination by the 
USPTO of a filed patent application.38o That is, an inventor would file for 
a patent, but actual examination on that application would be deferred 
until the inventor submitted her record of an actual reduction to practice. 
This deferred examination process would mimic the intent-to-use (ITU) 
application process in trademark law-where, when an applicant files an 
ITU application for a trademark, she affirms that she intends to use the 
mark in commerce within a defined period from the date of filing.38 ' If 
377· Inequitable conduct provides a self-verification mechanism for statements made to the 
USPTO, allowing examiners to rely on the threat of patent unenforceability to ensure that statements, 
such as the success of an actual reduction to practice, are true. See Christopher A. Cotropia, 
Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723 (2009). 
378. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
379· For example, if some of the claims were not reduced to practice, then those claims would not 
be eligible for examination. 
380. The concept of deferred examination is nothing new. See Changes to Practice for Petitions in 
Patent Applications to Make Special and for Accelerated Examination, 71 FED. REG. 36,323, 36,323-24 
(proposed June 26, 2oo6) (proposing a deferred examination system, although not keyed off an actual 
reduction to practice requirement). 
381. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2006); Barry S. Wilson, Comment, Registration of Trademarks by the 
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she fails to record actual use within this defined period, her ITU 
application is considered to be abandoned.382 A similar process would 
work with the actual reduction to practice requirement, with an initial 
filing prior to actual reduction operating like an ITU and the applicant 
getting a defined period within which she needs to actually reduce to 
practice or her patent application is abandoned.383 An applicant can 
essentially choose, during this deferral period, whether it is worth going 
forward with development and reducing it to practice before patent 
examination ever begins. 
Accordingly, inventors would file as early as they do under the 
current early-filing system. Once the inventor conceives of the invention 
and can enable it in writing, they can file for a patent. However, the 
USPTO would not immediately devote any resources to the pending 
application.384 Instead, the onus is on the applicant to continue with 
development and, before the deferral period expires, actually reduce the 
invention to practice in order to get the application examined and obtain 
a patent. This solution does not change the date of filing, but it does 
change the date of examination. 
B. BENEFITS TO AN ACTUAL REDUCTION TO PRACTICE REQUIREMENT 
I. An Actual Reduction to Practice Requirement Would Generate 
More Invention Information and Would Reduce Uncertainty 
When Examination Begins 
By requiring an actual reduction to practice before the grant of a 
patent, patenting would still be early but not as early as under current 
doctrine. The inventor would need to proceed further down the 
technology development path prior to receiving patent protection. The 
Intent-to-Use Application, I2 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES IIO, IIo-I5 (2001) (describing the ITU 
process). 
382. See IS U.S.C. § IOSI(d); Todd Jacobsen, Trademark Application Abandonment Under the 
Lanham Act, I2 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 120, I2I n.7 (zooi) ("Failure of an ITU applicant to file a 
timely statement of use also amounts to abandonment of the application."). 
383. The defined period in which an initial application must be converted for examination by 
actual reduction to practice can be changed depending on the invention's technological area. A good 
starting period would be to use Japan's deferred examination period of three years-giving certainty 
to those wondering if an initial application is going to be examined while providing time for inventors 
to complete the reduction to practice process. See Japan Patent Office, Procedures for Obtaining a 
Patent Right, http://www.jpo.go.jp/cgi/linke.cgi?url=/tetuzuki_e/t_gaiyo_e/pa_right.htm (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2009). 
384. Deferred examination has this benefit of not utilizing examination resources until 
examination is elected. See Matthew L. Goldberg, The Viability of Stimulating Technology-Oriented 
Entrepreneurial Activity in China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: How Regulations and Culture 
Encourage the Creation, Development, and Exploitation of Intellectual Property, I INT'L L. & MGMT. 
REv. I, 2I (zoos) ("Japan has a deferred examination period for patents. Under this rule, a patent 
application is examined only after a request for examination is filed."). 
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actual reduction to practice requirement would force the inventor to 
perform some successful prototyping and testing before examination 
begins.385 
An actual reduction to practice requirement would generate more 
technical information about the invention. The inventor would find out 
how the invention operates under real-world conditions.386 In addition, 
the inventor would need to develop her invention to the point where 
those skilled in the art would be sure that the invention works for its 
intended purpose.387 This pushes the invention closer to commercial 
viability prior to the election of examination and the patent grant, in turn 
providing more information about the invention's feasibility. 
Additional technical information and definition reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding the invention before examination begins. The 
inventor gains a better handle on whether the invention provides the 
wanted results. Furthermore, the additional time that passes while actual 
reduction to practice is occurring produces more information of its own. 
This all places the actual examination forward in time, giving the 
inventor more certainty as to the invention's ultimate commercial 
worth.388 
Admittedly, the actual reduction to practice requirement does not 
guarantee the production of market information. The requirement is not 
tied to commercial viability.389 But, as mentioned earlier, it is unlikely 
that an inventor would proceed further technically without gathering-
either intentionally or by happenstance-more market information 
about the invention.390 Technical feasibility also gives some sense of 
market viability because an invention that does not produce the intended 
result-an invention that would fail the actual reduction to practice 
requirement-has little market worth. These types of inventions would 
385. See, e.g., Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
("Testing is required to demonstrate reduction to practice in some instances because without such 
testing there cannot be sufficient certainty that the invention will work for its intended purpose."); 
Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (relying on a videotape of a prototype of the 
invention in operation to establish actual reduction to practice). 
386. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing the 
prototypes built by the inventor and the specific tests he performed to determine whether the invented 
catheter would work well in humans). 
387. See, e.g., Slip Track, 304 F.3d at 1265 (viewing the inventor's real-world tests of a prototype of 
his invention to help walls withstand environmental forces through the eyes of a PHOSIT A). 
388. See Abramowicz, supra note 14, at HY75-76 (noting that each additional year gives more 
certainty as to the invention's worth). 
389. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that to be 
an actual reduction to practice, the testing does not need to establish that the invention is in a 
commercially-satisfactory stage of development). 
390· See supra Part III.A.1-2. 
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be eliminated prior to the election of examination because they would 
not pass a mandatory actual reduction to practice requirement. 
2. An Actual Reduction to Practice Requirement Would Reduce the 
Costs Associated with the Early-Filing Doctrine 
There are many benefits of pushing the examination decision until 
after actual reduction to practice. Initially, this allows the inventor to 
make the first decision to commit USPTO resources to examination with 
more information about the invention and, in turn, less uncertainty about 
its value. She knows if the invention produces the intended result. She 
can make a more informed call as to whether the invention is worth 
patenting. In addition, to get to this stage of actual reduction to practice, 
she needs to invest more of her own resources. 
More invention information and greater resource investment prior 
to examination reduces the number of conceived ideas that turn into 
examined patent applications. Examination does not occur until later in 
the development process-that is, further to the right of the development 
process depicted in Figure 1 above. By pushing the beginning of 
examination to this later stage, some ideas will simply not make it. Either 
the lack of any value will become clear or the inventor will conclude that 
the potential value of a conceived idea is not great enough to justify 
engaging in the process of actually reducing to practice in the first place. 
This lowers the number of patent applications to be examined, 
minimizing one of the problems with the current early filing system. 
There may also be fewer follow-up applications because 
examination occurs later in time. What is currently a continuation 
application would turn into an initial application where examination is 
elected with an actual reduction to practice requirement. Reducing the 
number of applications to be examined would also lower the number of 
issued patents. Importantly, this reduction is not done arbitrarily, but is 
the product of making the inventor go further down the development 
path prior to examination. 
Actually reducing to practice prior to patenting also increases the 
chances of commercialization. It does this in two ways. First, examination 
occurs later and under less uncertainty. The inventor, when electing 
examination by actually reducing to practice, knows more about the 
commercial value of the invention.39' An invention is actually reduced to 
practice when there are test results that "suffice to persuade practical 
men to take the risk of commercializing the invention. "392 And the less 
uncertainty when electing examination, the more likely the patent holder 
will choose commercialization. 
39 I. See supra Part II I.A. I -2. 
392. Goodrich v. Harmsen, 442 F.2d 377,383 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (emphasis omitted). 
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Second, the inventor has more invested in the invention when she 
receives the patent. This means that full-blown commercialization is not 
as comparatively costly as it is under the current system. Put another 
way, while the price to acquire the option is higher, the exercise price is 
lower, making it more likely that those patent options purchased will be 
exercised- that is, commercialized.393 Referring to Figure 3 above, the 
difference between the cost of the option and the cost of exercising is less 
under the proposed solution. 
By making commercialization more likely, an actual reduction to 
practice requirement makes patent trolls less likely. The choice of 
asserting the patent is not as cheap compared to commercialization as it 
is under the current system. Since commercialization is less expensive, 
given that patenting occurs closer to commercializing, asserting the 
patent in litigation is not as inviting of an option. The difference in 
exercise price between asserting the patent and commercializing the 
underlying technology, shown in Figure 4 above, is less. The inventors 
who obtain patents under the proposed solution are more invested in 
bringing the invention to the market. This makes them less likely to turn 
to patent-troll-like activities. And there are less unused patents-with 
high commercialization costs-available to those wishing to engage in 
patent-troll-like litigation.394 
The additional invention-specific information produced by an actual 
reduction to practice also helps to better define the patent's scope of 
exclusivity. Including a description of the actual reduction to practice in 
the patent's specification provides more invention information to assist 
in interpreting patent claims.395 
c. FLEXIBILITY OF THE REQUIREMENT HELPS PRESERVE EARLY FILING 
BENEFITS 
Requiring an actual reduction to practice to obtain patent 
protection has potential negative effects. It delays the issuance of a 
patent, which may undermine the prospect-oriented nature of the patent 
system. Such a requirement increases the cost of patenting, forcing an 
inventor to both expend resources and engage in uncertain research 
393· See KELLEY, supra note 168, at 106-17 (explaining how building a prototype assists the 
development process and providing examples from Amazon. com and Apple); THOMKE, supra note 168, 
at so--51 (arguing that testing and experinientation is crucial to the successful development of new 
technologies). 
394· This situation-acquisition of uncommercialized patents by patent trolls-has occurred 
before. "Since the dot-com collapse, bankruptcy auctions have been a fruitful source of electronics and 
software patent rights" for patent trolls. J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. 
Sci. & TEcH. L. 388, 392 (2oo6). 
395· See Cotropia, supra note 347, at 83-87 (arguing that the use of invention-specific information 
in the specification minimizes information costs, making determining claini-meaning more efficient). 
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without the security of patent protection. There is also the potential for 
small inventors to be priced out of the patent process-unable to reduce 
to practice because of the lack of resources or expertise.396 Even more 
resource-rich inventors may be priced out if the invention's reduction 
costs are abnormally high. The incentive to come up with the initial idea 
may also be lost. 
But all of these critiques fail to take into account the flexibility 
inherent in the actual reduction to practice requirement. The 
requirement does not always require extensive testing under actual 
working conditions.397 Testing needs to go only as far as necessary to 
establish that the invention works as intended. If, in a given field, 
computer simulation or laboratory tests satisfy such an inquiry, that is all 
that is required by the actual reduction to practice requirement.398 The 
requirement tailors the level of development needed to what is required 
in a given industry to establish feasibility.399 And feasibility requirements 
typically adjust with costs and implementation barriers associated with 
the final, commercial embodiment.400 
The requirement also does not require proof of a perfected 
invention.401 The key is establishing that the invention works, not "how 
well the [invention] works."402 "[T]here is certainly no requirement that 
an invention, when tested, be in a commercially satisfactory stage of 
development in order to reduce the invention to practice. "403 
This flexibility in the requirement does a few of things. First, the 
flexibility prevents the requirement from pricing small inventors with 
fewer resources out of the patent system. An actual reduction to practice 
is costly, but not as costly as it may seem at first blush. Second, it narrows 
the gap between the patenting costs of inventions that are cheaper to 
implement and those that are more expensive. Third, the requirement 
does not push patenting too far down the development cycle. There is 
396. The underlying assumption, that we need to provide patents for small inventors, is not a 
given. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 35, at 173--83 (noting that it is unclear whether patents give 
much value to small inventors). 
397· CHISUM, supra note 374, § ro.o6(2)(a). 
398. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
399· See Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831,838 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). "Some devices are so simple and their purpose and efficacy so obvious that their complete 
construction is sufficient to demonstrate their workability." E. Rotorcraft Corp. v. United States, 384 
F.2d 429, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
400. See, e.g., Williams v. Adm'r of the Nat'! Aeronautics & Space Admin., 463 F.2d 1391, 1399-
1400 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (finding a laboratory test of a component of a claimed spin-stabilized, 
synchronous communications satellite sufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice). 
401. See Coffee v. Guerrant, 3 App. D.C. 497, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1894) ("A perfect invention does not 
necessarily mean a perfectly constructed machine .... "). 
402. DSL Dynamic Scis. Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d n22, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
403. /d. 
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still significant space between the invention and complete 
commercialization. Thus patents can still act as prospects, but they are 
prospects that require a bit more front-end work to obtain than they do 
under the current system. Fourth, the flexibility prevents an actual 
reduction to practice requirement from forcing the inventor away from 
the natural path of development in the relevant technological field. The 
solution does not ask the inventor to do anything different than would be 
done in the normal course of commercializing the invention-patenting 
just occurs at a later stage. 
Furthermore, technological areas that really benefit from the 
prospect nature of patents are unaffected by an actual reduction to 
practice requirement. Technological areas such as chemistry and biology, 
which are typically championed as the areas that fully utilize the prospect 
nature of patents,4" 4 are already under patentability requirements that de 
facto force the inventor to actually reduce the invention to practice prior 
to filing.4" 5 For example, to meet the utility requirements set forth in In re 
Fisher, the inventor had to find and prove an end use for the claimed 
ESTs.400 To do this, the inventor already has to actually reduce to 
practice. This Article's proposed solution changes little in these 
technological fields.4"7 
Placing the actual reduction to practice requirement within a 
deferred examination scheme helps to further alleviate potential 
problems with the proposal. There is still early filing shortly after 
conception, meaning that the patent race is still stopped at the same time 
404. Lemley. supra note 117, at 141 (noting that the prospect theory makes more sense "when 
control over subsequent development is a necessary part of the incentive to produce the pioneering 
invention in the first place, as is arguably true with pharmaceuticals"). 
405. Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1678-80 ("[T]he inventor can have patent protection for 
any given molecule only after a substantial investment has already been made in isolating and 
characterizing the molecule."). 
406. 421 F.3d 1365, 1369-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
407. There is still a concern that is worth noting. If a reduction to practice is a requirement, the 
creation of improvements-inventions that build upon already-patented technology-may be tougher 
to come by because actual infringement of the earlier patent would be mandated to meet the patent 
requirements. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (indicating that "use" constitutes infringement); Christopher 
A. Cotropia & Mark Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1421, 1432-33 (2009) (describing 
the blocking patent situation arising from a patent on a base technology and the attempt to develop 
and patent an improvement). I thank Clarisa Long for this insight. 
This concern is likely minimal because an inventor can still file a patent application prior to 
reduction to practice and then engage in the typical blocking patent bargaining. The single 
use/infringement requirement to start examination is also so de minimis that the minimal remedies 
available are unlikely to spur a lawsuit or deter most improvements. Finally, if this is a real problem, 
then it is one that should already be plaguing those fields governed by the heighted utilty and 
enablement requirements, where a de facto actual reduction to practice standard is being applied. See 
supra notes 404-o6. 
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as under the current system.4o8 This captures the second benefit Kitch 
articulated to early filing-ending wasteful patent races.409 
Allowing for an initial filing prior to an actual reduction to practice 
could facilitate a market for reducing inventions to practice.410 Even 
inventors with little resources can shop their initial filing around to find 
those willing to aid in reducing the invention to practice. Others may 
monitor the initial filing to see what applications look promising or fit 
within their company's technical direction and initiate talks with the 
inventor to assist in reducing the invention to practice in exchange for an 
interest in the resulting patent right. The creation of this market would 
both help maintain the incentive for the creation of base ideas and give 
small inventors a vehicle by which they could reduce to practice and 
obtain patent protection. Building in a deferral period between initial 
filing and the beginning of examination provides a nice transition 
between the existing early filing system and the proposed solution. 
Finally, the costs of an actual reduction to practice requirement 
have to be weighed against the benefits. There is a zero sum here. While 
alleviated partially by deferred examination, a shift away from the early-
filing doctrine is still a shift away and some of the doctrine's benefits are 
lost. But these negatives have an upside-they minimize the many costs 
to early filing already articulated. And many of these costs, created by 
the lack of invention information and uncertainty at the time of early 
filing, directly frustrate many of the articulated benefits of early filing.411 
Thus, while an actual reduction to practice requirement may not allow 
the patent system to fully enjoy the benefits of early filing, such a 
requirement is unlikely to make the system any worse off with regards to 
these benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The basic goal of the patent system is the production of socially 
beneficial technology. That is, technology that society can actually use. 
The current early-filing doctrine clearly does not facilitate such 
production. And given the focus of recent scholarship and pending first-
to-file legislation, such a solution appears unlikely. While this Article 
might not propose a perfect solution, the proposed modified actual 
408. Filing ends the typical patent race. See Duffy, supra note 15, at 499-500. 
409. Kitch, supra note 12, at 265-{;6. 
410. Others have suggested a market for ideas, albeit before a patent application is filed. See Oren 
Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Markerplace for Ideas?, 84 TEx. L. REv. 395, 399-402, 421 (2005) 
(arguing for an idea auction, where if the high bidder in the development stage fails "to produce a 
patent or product within a given period, say two years" the idea is placed into the public domain). 
411. See supra Part IIJ.C. (noting how early filing both hampers commercialization and increases 
patent terms). 
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reduction to practice requirement is a step in the right direction. Patent 
reforms can be extremely effective if they are directed at the root of the 
problems being considered. Here, the problem is the circumstances 
surrounding the decision to patent. By making this a better-informed 
decision, reforms can go a long way in mitigating many of the current 
problems with the patent system. 
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